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CHAPTER I 
 
 
A WORLD IN UPHEAVAL:  THE INFLUENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION ON MAN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HORSE 
 
The relationship between man and horse developed in tandem with the evolution 
of human society.  In the beginning, the relationship was one of predator and prey; 
however, as man uncovered the usefulness of the horse, the relationship altered into one 
of master and servant, remaining that way ever since.  The first horse was 
Hyracotherium, the “shrew beast”, or Eohippus “the dawn horse” in America.  
Hyracotherium was about twelve inches tall and had three to four toes.  It lived during 
the Eocene epoch or 54 to 38 million years ago.1  During the Oligocene epoch (38 to 26 
million years ago), the first horse developed into a sheep-like mammal with one large 
middle toe with two smaller side ones.  He was known as Mesohippus.2  At this time, 
Mesohippus vanished from Europe.3  During the Miocene epoch (26 to 12 million years 
ago), at this time the horse was pony-sized with the middle toe now developed into a cleft 
hoof while the secondary toes became vestigial.  It was known as Merychippus.4  During 
the Pliocene epoch (12 to 2 million years ago), the horse was now four feet tall with a  
 
                                                 
1
  Matthew Kust,  Man and Horse in History  (New York:  Advent Books, 1983), 1. 
2
  Ibid., 2-3. 
3
  Ibid., 3. 
4
  Ibid., 3. 
  2
fully developed cleft hoof.  Phliohippus migrated from North America to Asia and 
Europe over the land bridge in the Bering Sea.5  A million years prior to the Pleistocene 
epoch (2 million to 10,000 years ago), the modern horse, Equus Caballus, appeared 
throughout the world.  Equus Caballus was the first horse that humans tamed, in 
particular the species of the tarpan.6  Approximately 10,000 years ago, the horse died out 
in the Western Hemisphere along with all of the other large mammals, save for bison.7  
The reasons are unknown; however, scientists theorize that the disappearance could be 
linked to changes in vegetation or overhunting by humans. 8  Another theory suggests that 
both the large fauna and the Clovis people of North America died out due to a comet 
hitting the Continent around 12,900 years ago, which covered the land in a black layer of 
sediment and jump started a mini ice age.9  The horse did not return to the Western 
Hemisphere until the exploration of the New World by the Spanish Conquistadors.   
Horse breeds are divided into three categories based on general temperament.  
The “hot bloods” were bred for speed and endurance and possess a spirited disposition.  
That temperament makes them high-strung and easily frightened.  This category includes 
the Arabian and the Thoroughbred.10  The second category is known as the “cold bloods.”  
These horses are heavy draft horses bred for heavy labor and possess a gentle, calm 
nature.  This category includes the Shire, the Clydesdale, and the Friesian.11  The final 
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  Ibid., 5. 
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  Pita Kelekna,  The Horse in Human History  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11. 
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of Sciences  104 (October 2007):  16016. 
10
  Hot Blood Breed Information,  www.horses-and-horse-information.com/articles/horses-hotbloods.shtml.  
(accessed 01 July 2009), 1-2. 
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  Cold bloods Breed Information,  www.horses-and-horse-information.com/articles/horses-
coldbloods.shtml.  (accessed 01 July 2009), 2. 
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category is a combination of the cold and hot breeds, known as the “warm bloods.”  This 
category comprises the largest number of horse breeds.  The warm blood has the calmer 
temperament of the draft horse with the endurance and speed of the hot blood.  Most 
warm bloods were developed in Europe from the mating of European cold bloods with 
the hot bloods captured in the Middle East during the Crusades.  The warm blood has 
become the most popular category around the world as a pleasure and a working breed.  
This category includes the American Quarter Horse, the Andalusian, and the 
Lipizzaner.12 
The histories of man and horse have been intertwined for tens of thousands of 
years.  Humans first encountered horses as a source of food during the Pleistocene epoch.  
Because the horse can run upwards of forty miles per hour over sustained distances, man 
was forced to use ingenuity to capture one of his favorite meats; this included using traps 
and running them off cliffs.13  It is generally believed that the horse was first 
domesticated for its meat in the grasslands north of the Black Sea in what is now Ukraine 
by the Scythians and the Sarmatians.  The horse then spread south to Asia Minor and 
onto Northern Africa.14  Once man understood the potential for the horse’s strength and 
speed, it was raised less for its meat and hide and more for labor.15  The idea of using 
horses as beasts of burden was not a new concept for ancient peoples.  Early man 
harnessed the horse’s strength and speed by hitching it to a cart, much like oxen had been 
used for hundreds of years.16  Many civilizations had been using oxen for centuries; 
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however, the idea of pulling man behind horses into war was novel, leading to the 
invention of the chariot.  Horses were used to pull troops into battle like a taxi system and 
then later as an actual war machine.  Chariots were used as early as 1900 BC in Asia 
Minor.  The chariot became the first war machine and since then the horse was at the 
forefront of war technology, deemed a necessity rather than a liability during campaigns.  
Horseback riding was only adopted after centuries of chariot warfare and even then it was 
reserved for the elite.  Cavalries were not used in battle until 850 BC.17  By this time, the 
use of the horse was fully entrenched in the logistics and mindset of the ancient military 
and would remain so far centuries. 
The Napoleonic cavalry tradition of arme blanche consisted of many separate 
tactical aspects.  Napoleon’s cavalry was divided into a light division and a heavy 
division.  The light cavalry was used to pursue the enemy as well as for scouting while 
the heavy cavalry was reserved for attacks on the enemy’s flanks or rear and shock 
action.18  Both cavalries were employed in lined charges, usually two deep.  Napoleon 
preferred to use his cavalries as an “instrument for shattering the enemy line.”19  
Napoleon’s cavalry was armed with a sword, a sabre, a lance, and a firearm; however, 
they were too large, cumbersome, and could not be reloaded on horseback.20  Napoleon 
valued his heavy cavalry force the most and, thus, the cavalry charge.  Napoleon began 
deploying the cavalry against the infantry and the artillery with heavy losses.21  This 
trend of continued throughout the nineteenth century. 
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 Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, the pace of society quickly sped up to a 
fever pitch with the Industrial Revolution.  Prior to the Industrial Revolution, Britain, as 
well as the rest of the Continent, relied on its own resources rather than on expanded 
trade to maintain economic prosperity.  The Industrial Revolution changed the economic 
system in the Northern Hemisphere by increasing the amount of goods produced within 
each country.  This abundance of goods allowed the European nations, as well as North 
America, to expand their trade relations.  The Industrial Revolution in Europe and the 
United States allowed the booming growth in economics and population that led to the 
advancement of science and technology as well as the creation of enormous mass armies 
that led to the decline of the war horse in the twentieth century.  The Industrial 
Revolution is a label for the rapid development of heavy weight production and is 
generally believed to have begun in 1735 in Great Britain, when coal was adopted for 
industrial use in iron smelting.  The invention of smelting iron core with coal gave Britain 
the ability to rapidly develop and increase its iron production.22  Britain, as well as later 
other Western nations, was able to rapidly develop many technological innovations that 
would not have been possible without large amounts of iron products; this includes 
railways, automobiles, airplanes, tanks, and electricity.  Prior to contemporary times, the 
horse was the greatest asset that both warring and peaceful man possessed.  During the 
Industrial Revolution, new technology required a new term to describe its power.  In 
1783, James Watt created the term of “horsepower” to describe the power of the new 
movers.  Watt defined one horsepower as the amount of work required from a horse to 
pull 150 pounds out of a hole that was 220 feet deep.  Watts calculated the kinetic energy 
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  Sima Lieberman, ed.,  Europe and the Industrial Revolution  (Cambridge, MA:  Schenkman Pub., 1972), 
463-64. 
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as 33,000 ft-lb per minute.  Two horses together produced over thirty hp.23  By the 1920s, 
Henry Ford’s Model T engine had approximately twenty-five hp.24  By 1950, the average 
automobile engine possessed 150 hp.25  Even during the Industrial Revolution, modern 
man depended heavily on horse power until manufacturing times matched the sped of 
technological development after World War II.  The Industrial Revolution swiftly 
changed the dynamics of warfare with its mechanical inventions and ideas of mass 
production.  Beginning in the 1850s, the horse began to experience a rapid decline in use 
in warfare as well as on the domestic front.  The days of the horse faded into the past with 
the mechanization of the Western Powers during the Second World War. 
 Little has been written directly on the history of the horse’s decline in warfare.  In 
general, there exist five categories of academic research that pertains to this complex 
subject matter.  The first category of research is economic and agricultural histories such 
as W. O. Blanchard’s Economic Geography of Europe, Alexis Antsiferov’s Russian 
Agriculture during the War, and Witt Bowden’s An Economic History of Europe since 
1750.  These histories examine the effect of economics on the social fabric of nations.  
The second category is the anthropological history of the horse.  This type of research 
includes such books as Sandra Olsen’s Horses through Time, Elwyn Edward’s Horses:  
Their Role in the History of Man, and Matthew Kust’s Man and Horse in History.  The 
third category is the history of different cavalries including the Marquess of Anglesey’s 
The History of the British Cavalry, Janusz Piekalkiewicz’s The Cavalry of World War II, 
and George Hofmann’s Through Mobility We Conquer:  the Mechanization of the U.S. 
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  J. Edward Chamberlin,  Horse:  How the Horse has Shaped Civilizations  (New York:  BlueBridge, 
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25
  Robert Sickels,  American Popular Culture through History:  the 1940s.  (New York:  Greenwood Pub., 
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Cavalry.  This type of research examines the individual histories of the various cavalries 
of different nations.  The fourth category is the history of specific wars such as Norman 
Stone’s The Eastern Front 1914-1917, Clive Ponting’s The Crimean War, and John 
Keegan’s The Second World War.  This area of research is quite diverse and vast and 
examines the backgrounds and specific histories of individual wars.  The final category of 
research is the history of technology.  This includes everything from general histories to 
the history of individual inventions.  As with the previous category, the research of 
technology is immense and includes such examples as Kenneth Macksey’s works Tank 
Warfare and Technology in War and the multiple volume work of The History of 
Technology.   
 The eclipse of the war horse took a mere 100 years from 1850 to 1950 and during 
that relatively short span of time, the war horse went from a wartime necessity to a 
wartime oddity.  During the Victorian Era and the early twentieth century, technology 
quickly replaced the horse’s wartime responsibilities beginning with the railroad and 
ending with the motorized vehicles of World War I and World War II.  Mechanization 
removed the need for horses in the areas of transportation, communication, and combat 
quickly as the decades passed.  By the end of the Second World War, the horse was no 
longer the most valuable asset of an army.  From the Crimean War to the end of the 
Second World War, technology methodically edged the horse out of its traditional roles 
in warfare and the home front, forcing it into a state of limbo no longer needed in society 
outside of being a guilty pleasure of times gone by. 
 The following chapters will progress chronologically from 1850 to 1945.  Chapter 
Two will explore the employment of horses and the progression of modern technology 
  8
that began to replace the horse on the battlefield beginning with the Crimean War of 
1853-1856, continuing with the American Civil War from 1861-1865, followed by the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, and ending with the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.  
Chapter Three will examine the effects of modern warfare on the employment of horses 
during the First World War.  This chapter will examine the horse’s combat experiences 
on the Western Front with its more traditional employment on the Eastern Front.  It will 
also look at the development of warfare technology that quickly eclipsed the horse in the 
war including the automobile, the tank, and the airplane.  Chapter Four will explore the 
swift passing of the horse on the Western Front during the Second World War as well as 
the resurgence of de-modernized warfare on the Eastern Front by the German and Soviet 
troop.  Chapter Four will discuss the issues that these armies encountered that forced both 
sides to revert to horse-drawn movement.  And finally, Chapter Five will conclude this 
treatise by briefly examining the complete decline of the horse in warfare as well as on 
the home front immediately following the war.  This Chapter will also look at the horse’s 
new role in man’s society:  the pleasure horse. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AND THE HORSE DURING THE  
VICTORIAN AND EDWARDIAN ERAS, 1850-1900 
 
The Crimean War:  The First Modern War to Signal the 
Decline of the War Horse, 1853-1856 
In 1929, an article in the Cavalry Journal professed that “the horse was the first 
animal of war, and it is inconceivable that war will ever be waged without him” and that 
it remained so for one hundred years after decades of declines.26  The decline of the war 
horse began during the Crimean War, where trench warfare was first conceptualized.  
The Crimean War was the first modern war since the Napoleonic Wars where new 
technologies, tactics, and strategies played a major role in the outcome of the war.  The 
Crimean War lasted from 1853 to 1856 and was fought over the question of sovereignty 
in Turkey.  Both Napoleon III of France and Nicholas I of Russia claimed influence in 
the Ottoman Empire.  The nations of France, Britain, Sardinia, and Turkey united against 
Russia in 1853, officially declaring war in March 1854.  The war was fought on multiple 
fronts across the Russian frontier as well as into Western Turkey.  The Treaty of Paris 
ended the conflict in February 1856.  The war is named after the region of fighting that  
 
                                                 
26
 G.C.H.V. Anglesey,  A History of the British Cavalry, 1816 to 1919,  5 vols.  (London:  Pen and Sword, 
1982), 389. 
  10
garnered the most attention at the time, the Crimean Peninsula.  The war was fought on 
multiple fronts including in the Baltic, in Central Europe, and on the Crimean peninsula 
in the Black Sea.  Of the three fronts, the Crimean peninsula was the most influential of 
the war.  The three major Allied powers of France, Great Britain, and Turkey battled 
Russia for influence in the collapsing Middle East.  To protect its entire frontier, Russia 
had 270,000 men in the Baltic, 200,000 in Central Europe, and 60,000 in the Crimea at 
the beginning of the war.27  The first major battle in the Crimea was the Battle of Alma 
where the Allied forces faced 33,000 infantry and 3,400 cavalry.28  The Crimean War 
was the first time the railroad was employed by numerous militaries in wartime.  The 
horse still was used by the British, French, and Russian armies to great extent; however, 
the Crimean War began the war horse’s rapid descent from wartime necessity to wartime 
anomaly.   
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Russian Army was the largest in the world 
with a peace strength of 900,000 and the ability to raise thousands of more through 
serfdom.  Russia’s social structure ordered landlords to send between three and six serfs 
for every thousand to enroll in the national army; this equates to between 60,000 and 
80,000 a year.29  The French Army was the second largest military force at 439,000 in 
1850; however, during the war, the French strength was raised to 645,000 men.30  Unlike 
the Russian and French Armies, the British army was stationed throughout its vast 
colonies.  Its strength was estimated at 183,000 before the war, but the army to be sent to 
the Crimea only numbered 21,500 men.  During the course of the war, the British landed 
                                                 
27
 Winfried Baumgart,  The Crimean War, 1853-1856  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1999), 64. 
28
 Robert B. Edgerton,  Death or Glory:  the Legacy of the Crimean War  (Boulder:  Westview Press, 
1999), 21. 
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  Baumgart, Crimean War, 63. 
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close to 100,000 men in the Crimean region.  The biggest scourge of the war was not 
bullets or shells but illness.  More solders died due to disease than weaponry.31  Through 
its rotation system, Russia transported fresh troops to the Crimea from other fronts.  
Russia kept approximately 70,000 men in the area throughout the war, yet more than 
300,000 soldiers were stationed there at some point during the conflict.32  The Industrial 
Revolution made these large numbers possible.  Such massive numbers would have been 
unheard of prior to the Napoleonic Wars. 
In his 1853 treatise on cavalry, Captain Louis Nolan of the British Army lamented 
that “of all arms, cavalry is the most difficult to handle in the field.  It cannot engage an 
enemy except where the ground is favorable. It is always dependent on the condition of 
its horses.  It is easily dispersed, and it easily gets out of hand.  However brave and 
intrinsically good, it is of no use without good officers.”33  After the war United States 
General George McClellan wrote that the Russian Cavalry was probably the best in 
Europe, yet the British heavy cavalry was “somewhat better” than its Russian 
counterparts, but neither the light cavalry of Britain nor the one of France could match 
the Russian animals.34  During the war, the European cavalries were armed with carbines, 
lances, and sabers.  The British also carried the newly developed Colt revolvers; 
however, the revolver was generally ignored by the cavalrymen because it took two 
hands to recock the gun after each shot, making them difficult to handle during a 
galloping change.  During countless centuries of cavalry traditions, cavalrymen carried 
down the opinion that they were superior to the infantry.  Prior to the twentieth century, 
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  Ibid., 78. 
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the cavalry was comprised of wealthy aristocrats, especially among the officers; this 
added to the “air of immense superiority”.35  The lance and saber were of limited use 
until the cavalry engaged the enemy’s nervous infantry.  During the war, as with most 
conflicts, the cavalry charge depended mainly on courage and discipline rather than 
technology.  During the war, the British and French forces kept their cavalries on the 
flanks and used them mainly for reconnaissance in a limited number of charges including 
the Charges of the Heavy and Light Brigades.36  Despite McClellan’s glowing review of 
the Russian cavalry, it was mostly for show, only the dragoons, or mounted infantry, did 
well against the Allied forces.  Generally, the Russian horses were smaller and lighter 
than their Allied counterparts.  This created many problems for the Russian cavalry 
because the Russian riders tended to weigh much more then the French and almost as 
much as the British, who had stronger animals.  The Russian cavalry was also forced to 
carry food and cooking supplies while the French and Britain had supply trains for that.  
As a result, the Russians cavalry marched incredibly slow, averaging ten kilometers a day 
with horses frequently being marched dismounted and receiving on day a week for rest.37  
As in the Napoleonic Wars, the cavalry remained an integral part of the Crimean War. 
The most famous cavalry charge of all time occurred during the Crimean War and 
came in two parts.  The Charges of the Heavy and Light Brigades of the British Cavalry 
took place on October 25, 1854.  The light brigade was comprised of the 13th Light 
Dragoons, the 17th Lancers, the 11th Hussars, the 4th Light Dragoons, and the 8th Hussars 
while the Heavy Brigade was comprised of the 4th Dragoon Guards, the Royal Dragoons, 
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  Clive Ponting,  The Crimean War  (London:  Chatto and Windus, 2004), 23-4. 
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the Greys, and the 6th Dragoons.38  The Heavy Brigade drove back the Russian cavalry 
after the artillery duel of 17th of October.  The Charge of the Heavy Brigade was viewed 
as success; however, the subsequent charge of the Light Brigade has been viewed as one 
of the greatest blunders in military history.  The Light Brigade was supposed to pursue 
the fleeing Russians, who were attempting to remove the captured British artillery guns 
from the Redoubts.  The Commander of the Light Brigade, Lord Cardigan, received a 
vague order from Lord Raglan to charge the Russian troops.  The aide who delivered the 
message, Captain Nolan, pointed at the Russian artillery rather than the captured guns; 
thus, sending the Light Brigade on its ill-fated charge.  The Brigade charged through the 
valley toward the Russian artillery through cannon balls and bullets reaching the guns 
and killing several of the gunners before retreating back across the valley covered by the 
French army and the Heavy Brigade.39 Nolan had carelessly pointed at the retreating 
Russian cavalry, who had established themselves behind their own artillery lines at the 
end of the North Valley instead of the Causeway Redoubts.40  The Charge lasted a total 
of eight minutes.41  Upon their retreat, the Light Brigade collected and remained gathered 
for several hours while “stragglers and loose horses kept hobbling home, each being 
received by a hearty cheer at their unexpected appearance.”42  Captain Nolan was the first 
of the men killed during the charge.43  This ill-fated charge left 118 men died and 127 
were wounded on the ill-fated job.  During the disastrous charge, 470 out of the original 
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39
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673 horses were killed, 42 were wounded, and 43 others were later destroyed due to 
wounds or sickness.   
The Crimean War was the first was to use the railway system for military 
purposes.  The only railroad in Russia at the time was between Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.  Because of this, the Russian Army needed months to transport troops and 
supplies to the front by horse.  In contrast, the Western Powers built a good system of 
railways throughout the region and effectively used their navies to reach the Crimea more 
quickly than the Russians.44  The Western Allies used these railroads to bring supplies 
from the harbor of Balaclava to the front lines.45  Horses were transported by sea, which 
was extremely taxing on both man and beast.  “Our first night on board was one not 
easily to be forgotten. We very soon began to encounter a heavy swell—the result of a 
recent gale—which increased as the night wore on, from which the men and horses (not 
having got their ‘sea-legs’) suffered much, and the result of which was the loss of two 
horses on this first night.”46  Once the ship arrived in the Harbor, horses were deposited 
into the water and forced to swim ashore.47  All of the combatants were plagued by 
supply shortages, mostly due to bad roads and shipping problems caused by 
overcrowding at Balaklava.48  Because of the extreme shortages, both men and horses 
died of starvation.  It is estimated that the British cavalry lost 1,800 of its 2,000 horses 
during the first two months.49  Horses became too weak to haul their loads and sometimes 
resorted to eating each other’s manes and tails.  Cavalry mounts were used to replace the 
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draft animals; however, they were not up to the challenge and quickly perished as well.  
During the first winter, the cavalry basically vanished.50  As the weather worsened, the 
plight of the horses also worsened due to the lack of winter shelter and no transport to 
bring fodder to camp.  Lord Cardigan ordered no animal be shot unless it had a broken 
leg or an incurable disease.  As a result, the horses perished slowly of the cold and 
starvation in the Crimea.51  Supplies proved difficult to move because the carts also had 
to be loaded with so much fodder to keep the horses alive on the journey that hardly 
anything else could be carried.  The Russian supply system fared worse because officers 
were simply given money and instructed to feed the horses themselves, yet most pocketed 
the money instead.52  The French army fared the best of all of the combatants.  The 
French were able to sustain an army four times larger than the British despite its lack of 
shipping.  The conditions remained harsh, but the French solders never suffered from the 
same horrors as the British.53  The French horses suffered the same fate as the British 
horses, resulting in the cavalry being dismounted and double teams needed to move the 
lightest cargo loads.  Men were often used to bring up the much needed supplies.54  In 
general, the Russian army was better off than the British, but not as well off as the 
French.  The Russians were also plagued by supply shortages despite the fact that the war 
was fought within its borders, all supplies had to be transported by wagon while the 
French and British had their railroad.55   
                                                 
50
  Baumgart, Crimean War, 139. 
51
  Ponting, Crimean War, 160. 
52
  Ibid., 175-76. 
53
  Ibid., 174. 
54
 Alexander William Kinglake,  The Invasion of the Crimea, Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress 
Down to the Death of Lord Raglan,  4 vols.  (New York:  Harper, 1888-1899), 4:  132. 
55
 Baumgart, Crimean War, 142 
  16
The Crimean War ended the Concert of Europe as well as claimed hundreds of 
thousands of lives both in battle and by disease.56  It was one of the last times that the 
massed formations of cavalry and infantry were employed using Napoleonic tactics and 
strategies.57  With the end of the Concert of Europe, wars gripped the European nations 
fighting for territory, influence, and unity in some cases.  The war ended the friendly 
relations between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia, setting the stage for the 
rivalry that sparked the powder keg in the Balkans.  The war bankrupted Russia, forcing 
numerous reforms throughout the nation including the end of serfdom and the start of 
Russia’s Industrial Revolution; however, these reforms would prove ineffective at saving 
the Russian way of life.  After the Crimean War, armies fought with more advanced 
weapons, beginning the war horse’s decline in warfare. 
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The American Civil War:  a Tale of Feuding Brothers and their Horses, 1861-1865 
The Crimean War’s technology, tactics, and strategies heavily influenced the 
American Civil War and the role of the horse in the war.  Many historians have credited 
the American Civil War with the altering the use of cavalry forces to fit the change in 
modern warfare.  The transformation from shock tactics to mounted infantry came 
quickly during the war as new technologies and tactics made the Napoleonic doctrine of 
shock action obsolete for both the Union and Confederate cavalries.  Besides its other 
duties, the cavalry was trusted with both offensive and defensive missions.  Both of these 
types of missions were a novel development in response to the growing threat of a costly 
war.  Many historians debate the effectiveness of the offensive and defensive uses of the 
cavalry with regards to the war effort on either side of the battlefield; however, of the 
numerous uses of the cavalry forces, the new strategy of raiding proved to be the most 
effective use of the mounted infantry during the American Civil War. 
Prior to the American Civil War, most of the experienced officers in the Union 
mounted service were from the South and when war erupted in 1861, almost all of them 
joined the Confederacy’s cause for independence, giving the South an early advantage 
over the Union army.58  The Southerners adapted to the life of a cavalryman more readily 
due to their upbringing in the “gentlemanly tradition of horsemanship” than their Union 
counterparts because most Northerners were from urban locations such as laborers and 
shopkeepers.59  Most of the individuals in the North who joined the Union cavalry were 
from industrial and urban areas, most of whom “had grown away from the rigors of 
                                                 
58
  John K Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Story of the U.S. Cavalry:  1775-1942  (Boston:  Little Brown 
Book, 1953), 88.   
59
  Edward G. Longarce, Mounted Raids of the Civil War (New York:  A.S. Barnes, 1975), 16.  
  18
outdoor life.”60  However, the individuals from the Northwest, whose states were still 
attached to the “old frontier spirit,” were more like the Southerners.  These individuals 
had been raised on farms or homesteads and had more experience with horses and mules 
than the men from the Eastern states.61 
 The main supply of mounts for the Confederacy came from many of the Border 
States including Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia as well as Texas.62  Despite this 
supply of mounts, the Confederate government passed an act on March 6, 1861, which 
stated that “each mounted volunteer was to furnish his own horse and horse equipment, 
for which he was to receive forty cents a day and pay for the horse if it should be killed in 
action.”  The Provisional Government enacted the act for economic reasons as well as 
ideological ones, since it was believed that volunteers would take better care of their 
horses and equipment if it was their private property.  However, as the war progressed, 
the act became a nuance to Lee because men who lost their horse to illness, injury, or in 
action were sent on furlough to find new horses, yet with the economy crisis in full swing 
the horsemen had trouble obtaining fresh mounts quickly, keeping them out of action for 
numerous months.63 
The Confederate cavalry in the Tennessee Army continuously outnumbered the 
Union forces in the West throughout the war.  In the fall of 1862, the Confederates 
outnumbered the Union seven to three and nearly eleven to seven during the height of the 
Atlanta campaign.64  Because of the South’s long history with horses, the Confederacy 
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possessed better mounts and a better knowledge of proper animal maintenance.65  
Contrary to the act of March 6, 1861, cavalrymen were not inclined to take their 
personally furnished horses in battle because they knew that the government would not 
follow through on paying for a new animal; thus, the cavalrymen worried more about 
their mounts safety than their own; this mentality render many cavalry units ineffective 
during the course of the Civil War.66 
 As with all mounted cavalry units, maintaining mounts proved to be just as 
difficult for the Union army as supplying the animals.  Unlike the Confederates, the 
Union cavalrymen knew little to nothing about being a cavalry soldier or horses in 
general.67  Many horses were improperly shod until foraging in enemy regions produced 
an adequate supply of horseshoes.  Many men used knives and hatchets to shod horses, 
which caused lameness due to hoof problems for the horse.68  Another issue that arose 
due to the lack of experience with horses was ground feeding.  The feed and hay should 
not be placed on the ground because it can lead to sand colic if the horse ingests too much 
sand or gravel.  The Union cavalrymen repeatedly engaged in ground feeding, which 
caused large numbers of animals to become lame.69 
Compared to the Confederate cavalries, the Union cavalry units had enormous 
wastage in mounts.  Men would overweigh their horses with extra supplies as well as 
improperly care for the animals such as giving them too much water after a long march.  
In general, the Union cavalrymen had less experience in the area of horse care than the 
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Confederate cavalrymen.  The Union soldiers knew little about feeding, watering, 
packing, feet care, or wound care.  All of these mistakes led to huge losses in animals due 
to lameness.70 
 General Robert E. Lee pleaded repeatedly with the Provisional Government for 
aid both in the form of horses and supplies; however, the poor economic situation kept 
the Confederacy’s hands tied.  By 1864, the Provisional Government had devised a new 
way to fill the horse quotas quickly.  The government told Lee to remove all horses not 
absolutely necessary for agriculture from Confederate farmers; however, the government 
underestimated the importance of these horses, for this act only worsened the economic 
and agricultural crises in the South.71  By 1865, no laws that the Confederate government 
passed could ensure victory over the Union forces.  Inflation and supply shortages 
weakened all of the Southern armies beyond repair.  Lee, too weak from the lack of 
mounts and supplies, became surrounded by Union forces, who eventually forced Lee to 
surrender in April 1865.72 
 Like the shortages in weapons, the shortage in mounts stemmed from slow 
transportation and poor procurement methods by the Confederate government; however, 
unlike the weapon issues, the supply of horses in the Western theatre was plentiful.  The 
total military population in the West in 1860 was 484,065 while the total horse 
population was 919,532, with Texas having the highest ratio of men to horses.  Because 
of an ordnance by the Confederate government, all cavalry volunteers were ordered to 
supply their own mounts and equipment throughout the course of their military service.  
Each cavalryman was paid forty cents a day and compensated for the death of the animal 
                                                 
70
  Herr, U.S. Cavalry, 118-121. 
71
  Ramsdell, “Lee’s Horse Supply”, 763, 771. 
72
  Ibid., 776-777. 
  21
in battle.73  If mounts could not be furnished, cavalry units attempted to purchase animals 
from the local population and some even captured wild mustangs that roamed the Trans-
Mississippi region.74  The Confederate cavalries experienced heavy losses of mounts 
during the 1862-1863 winter campaigns in the West, almost all of these losses were due 
to lameness and disease rather than Union marksmanship.  Horses became lame for many 
reasons including lack of horseshoes, diseases involving soft hoofs and sore tongues, and 
exhaustion due to long campaigns without rest.  By Confederate law, dismounted 
cavalrymen had forty days to procure another animal or they would be transferred to the 
infantry.75  These furloughs greatly depleted the Confederate forces throughout the war, 
creating opportunities for the Union armies to defeat the Confederacy.  In 1863, the 
Confederate government passed a new law giving the cavalry commanders the power to 
seize all necessary animals and supplies from the local populations; this action created 
fear among the non-combatants in the Trans-Mississippi, leading them to fear their own 
cavalry units more than those of the Union.76  By December of 1864, the shortages in 
supplies and mounts caused by the transportation deficiencies of the Confederacy forced 
the army commanders to reduce the strength of the cavalry units in the West, moving the 
dismounted cavalrymen to the infantry and the horses to artillery units.77  However, this 
reduction did little to boost the number of victories for the South.  By 1865, the cavalries 
as well as the infantries of the South were in shambles, weakened by long supply 
shortages and large Union victories.  In April of 1865, Lee surrendered to General 
Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse; this was a demoralizing event for the other 
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Southern armies, leading to their own disbanding in the next month.  The Army of the 
Trans-Mississippi surrendered on May 26, 1865.78 
 Like the Confederate cavalry units, General James H. Wilson’s corps suffered 
from supply and mount shortages during his campaigns in the Western theatre, though 
never to the extent that the Confederacy did.  The biggest problem for Wilson was 
supplying healthy mounts and remounts to his troops.  In the beginning of the campaign, 
the shortages steamed from the stringent rules concerning the purchase of horses in the 
Union while the later shortages were caused by the lack of mounts in the immediate 
area.79  By December 1, 1864, the Union government passed laws allowing cavalry units 
to impress all needed animals from the local region, including the Vice President’s 
carriage horses.  Within seven days of the passing of the Union impressment law, 
Wilson’s troops were able to gather over seven thousand animals.80  Another source for 
mounts during Wilson’s campaigns in the West was the Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana 
regions.  Between September and December of 1864, the Union government authorized 
the impressing of animals in these three states, in hopes that the new supplies would 
reduce the shortages in Wilson’s cavalry corps.  By April 1865, Wilson had captured the 
town of Selma and impressed a large number of horses and mules, which actually created 
a surplus of 500 animals.  Rather than transporting the surplus elsewhere in the region, 
Wilson ordered that they be destroyed lest the animals fall back into Confederate hands.81  
Wilson had “no qualms about destroying anything of military value, but was ready to 
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countermand a destruct order if sufficient cause for its revocation could be 
demonstrated.”82 
The Civil War was a war of attrition to the special detriment of the Confederacy.  
The Confederate cavalries suffered from many of the some shortages felt by the infantry 
including food, clothing, and ammunition.83  While railroads were used to bring supplies 
to armies in the field, they had to use horsepower to move the much needed supplies and 
equipment to the front lines and as the years dragged on the use of horsepower to find 
and move supplies was increased as the Union armies disabled the railroads.  Because the 
railroads were under constant attack from the Union armies, General Lee and his cavalry 
units were forced to forage for food, supplies, and mounts in the surrounding territory.84  
The scarcity of supplies dictated Lee’s strategies for combating the Union armies in the 
Eastern theatre.  Lee was forced to remain on the defensive for most of the war compared 
to the offensive, which Lee’s education demanded he maintain. 85  The Union was better 
supplied, equipped, and had a larger region to supply the necessary mounts than the 
Confederate troops.86 
 Despite promising developments during the war, the cavalry on both sides 
experienced a retardation in evolution from its Napoleonic roots to the mobile arm of the 
army.  Its development was slowed by leaders on both sides who lacked the vision to use 
the cavalry to its fullest potential.  The Confederate cavalries in the West suffered at the 
hands of General Braxton Bragg and General John Bell Hood, who did not fully 
understand the cavalry’s potential and, therefore, limited their use to reconnaissance and 
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raiding parties.87  The other glaring evidence of mismanagement was General Bragg and 
General Hood limited use or misuse of the South’s two most successful cavalry leaders, 
General Joseph Wheeler and General Nathan Bedford Forrest.  Many historians believed 
that the South would have fared much better in the war had these two men been forced to 
work together.  Had Wheeler operated as the eyes of the army, and Forrest in command 
of operating on Federal communications, the Army of Tennessee would have had an 
almost unbeatable combination, yet Bragg and Hood gave in to Wheeler’s and Forrest’s 
hatred of one another and kept the two men separate to the detriment of the 
Confederacy.88  However, both the Union and the Confederacy was that both belligerents 
historically had little experience with operating, organizing, and implementing cavalry 
units and, thus, the cavalry was not used to its full potential on either side.89 
 In the North, General William T. Sherman and General Grant were at odds over 
the use of Union cavalry in the last years of the Civil War.  Sherman believed the cavalry 
to be an unnecessary arm of the Union army; thus, he did little to encourage its use in 
maneuvers.90  Sherman believed that the only use of cavalry units in modern warfare was 
as raiding parties.  General Grant, on the other hand, saw a potential in the cavalry as 
“mounted infantry” as shown by the Confederate cavalry under the command of Forrest.  
Grant ordered the tactics implemented in both the Eastern theatre under Sheridan and in 
the West under Wilson.  Wilson was officially assigned to command all of the cavalry in 
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the West as part of Sherman’s army in 1864 and became one of the most celebrated 
cavalrymen of the Union army after his successes in the Western theatre. 91 
The cavalries of both sides used tactics from the Napoleonic Wars in the 
beginning of the Civil War, mainly the idea of a shock charge to frighten the infantry; 
however, with the advent of new technologies, this type of charge became suicidal, 
leading the leadership of both sides to adopt new tactics and strategies including 
raiding.92  The Confederate Army in Virginia under Lee used both horses and mules for 
mobility, mainly for the cavalry, the artillery, and moving supplies and equipment.93  The 
cavalry saw huge developments in cavalry tactics, moving it from the realm of mobility 
to strategic operations such as raiding and reconnaissance.94  The cavalry engaged in 
numerous activities when not in battle:  the cavalry was expected to divert attention from 
the infantry, scout in enemy territory, carry on reconnaissance missions, carry messages 
to headquarters, escort field commanders, and clear paths for the main army.95  
Previously, the cavalry had been used by the Union to pursue fleeing enemy infantry after 
they had been defeated on the battlefield and for raids; however, Wilson saw the potential 
for the cavalry to be used both as a fighting force and as a means of pursuing the 
enemy.96  During his campaigns in the Western theatre, Wilson used his cavalry corps as 
a primary striking force similar to the infantry.  He ordered the cavalry to “fight alongside 
[the] infantry” before they continued their usual role in enemy pursuits.97 
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The Confederate armies used the cavalry for a variety of tasks such as front line 
fighting, digging trenches, covering flanks, pursuing the enemy after victory, covering 
the army in retreat, and screening infantry movements.  The Confederacy also employed 
the cavalry to scout in enemy territories and patrol the regions surrounding the main army 
to watch for ambushes.98  The Confederacy used the strategy of raiding as a “substitute 
for a more costly combat strategy” and that the main purpose of the raids was to limit the 
enemy’s ability to wage war; this meant attack any or all targets deemed valuable to the 
Union’s war effort including railroads and supply depots.99  The strategy of raiding 
illustrated a divergence from the Napoleonic-cavalry doctrine of shock action and pursuit.  
Raiding gave the cavalry an active role in the Civil War, outside of costly battles.  The 
use of raiding by both sides gave the cavalry a much needed purpose in modern warfare, 
allowing it to continue to develop into one of the most valuable branches of the military 
in the decades to come.   
 The only major innovation of the war was the expansion of the railroads around 
the world.  Because of its head start in the Industrial Revolution, Great Britain was the 
first world power to connect its borders with railways.  France’s railroad system began 
taking off during the reign of Napoleon III.100  Both the German States and Russia did not 
really experience the railroad boom until the 1860s.  By 1850, Great Britain possessed 
7,000 miles of track, the United States had 9,000 miles while Russia only had 410 
miles.101  After the disastrous results of the Crimean War, Russia significantly increased 
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its railroad construction.  By 1900, Russia possessed 53,500 miles of track.102  While 
many historians contend that the rise of the railroads in Europe and America started the 
decline of the horse in society; however, the railways actually increased the demand for 
horses because more animals were needed to transport goods and supplies to and from the 
railroad heads.103  Due to the advances in modern technologies such as the expansion of 
railways and the improvements to firearms, the American Civil War became the first total 
war where horses and the cavalry experienced a decline in effectiveness.  The war 
illustrated the ineffectiveness of Napoleonic tactics; however, all Western cavalries 
continued to strictly follow these traditional doctrines for decades to come. 
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The Franco-Prussian War:  the Last Great Cavalry War, 1870-1871 
The Franco-Prussian War continued to employ the war horse in its traditional role 
of transportation and cavalry; however, the advancements in warfare technology began to 
make the horse’s role in warfare more precarious.  The Franco-Prussian War saw 
developments in better artillery, better firepower, and better forms of the machine gun.  
The Franco-Prussian War officially began in July 1870 when Napoleon III of France 
declared war on the German principality of Prussia after much tension over the candidate 
for the vacant Spanish throne and the Ems Dispatch.  Prussia, backed by many of the 
other members of the German Confederation, captured Paris within five months of 
invading France.  The Treaty of Frankfurt ended the war in May 1871.  France’s defeat in 
the Franco-Prussian War created a deep hatred for the newly united Germany, leading to 
the tensions before the First World War.  The Franco-Prussian War was one of the final 
wars of the modern age prior to the era of total war that characterized the twentieth 
century.  The Franco-Prussian War was the last war to fully employ horses in the 
traditional vocations where new technologies did not alter the role of the horse in war 
drastically.   
The Franco-Prussian War was the final war of the modern age prior to the era of 
total war that characterized the twentieth century.  Prior to the war, the Prussian and 
French armies underwent many major renovations in technology, tactics, and structure.  
By 1866 both the Prussian and the French Armies converted their infantry from muzzle-
loading rifles to the newer breech-loading ones.  This new type of rifle allowed for more 
rapid firing and better accuracy.  The main difference between these two nations was that 
the French continued to believe in the value of Napoleonic style shock tactics by massed 
  29
column.104  However, these tactics did not take into account the unusual strategies of the 
Prussian Army under Moltke.  The Prussian Army used the tactic of scrambling smaller 
units and the flanking attack.  The French preferred narrow, fixed attacks straight on.105  
These smaller units skirmished in the front to cover the advancing army, while the full 
force crept ahead on the flanks.106  The war between France and Prussia broke out in the 
summer of 1870 after conflict over who should ascend the Spanish throne and the Ems 
Dispatch, in which the French ambassador allegedly insulted the King of Prussia.  France 
declared war on July 19 and promptly lost the conflict in lest than a year after the capture 
of Napoleon III and the fall of Paris in January of 1871.  Just prior to the outbreak of the 
war, Napoleon III divided the French Army into three forces:  the Army of the Rhine at 
Metz, I Corps in Alsace, and IV Corps at Châlons.  Napoleon III decided to take 
command of the Army of the Rhine personally despite having no military competency.  
Besides this division, the French Army never devised an actual war plan for handling a 
war with Prussia; this created confusion in the French mobilization.107  In response to the 
division of the French forces, Moltke created a similar three-pronged formation of the 
Prussian Army to attack the French wherever it reared its head.  The Prussians won the 
war not because the French Army’s strategies or incompetency of its commanders, but 
because of the “chaos of the French mobilization.”  The French Army had to mobilize 
quicker than the Prussians to assure victory and they simply did not do so.108  Within 
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eighteen days, 1,800,000 men prepared for the war in Germany with 462,000 being 
transported to the French border to begin the campaign.109 
Since the Crimean War, the railroad system had made leaps and bounds, 
increasing 200 percent from the 1860s to the eve of the First World War.  The railroad 
was the greatest contribution to the pace of the war.  During the Franco-Prussian War, a 
single line could carry eight trains a day and twelve on a double line.  By 1914, this 
number rose to forty and eighty respectively.110  The French mobilization was 
continuously hindered by railroad jams.  Because France did not possess enough 
“strategic railways” including double-tracked trunk lines from the industrial and 
population centers of the country; chaos ensured throughout the nation.  Prussia, on the 
other hand, placed its railroads, which were mostly double lines, with the vision of 
invasion in mind.  French mobilization had to rely on single tracked lines that only 
traveled in one direction.  Because of this railroad difference, it took France three weeks 
to mass an army Corps while Prussia accomplished the same task in three to five days.111  
The railways were most important during the mobilization period of the war.  They 
proved to be of limited use as the Armies advanced because they were unable to 
effectively move supplies to the front.112  The Prussian Army preferred to use 
continuously advancing supply bases to replenish its supplies.  These bases were 
stationed at the rear of the Prussian Army and used the captured roads and railways to 
keep the Army in working order.113  Also, the Prussian transported entire regiments to the 
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front while the French rushed men from all of the regiments and assembled them at the 
front.114  The Franco-Prussian War was the first war to amass enormous forces in a short 
amount of time; this trend continued into the twentieth century and even dramatically 
increased.  Between July 16 and August 6, the French Eastern Railroad transported over 
315,000 men and 162,000 horses to the front while the Northern Railroad transported 
another 200,000 men and 15,000 horses.115 
Before the outbreak of the war, France had 50,000 horses and required an annual 
supply of 7,000 for remounts.  The Prussian Army had 75,000 horses and asked for 8,000 
new mounts a year.  The war quadrupled these figures.  During the conflict, France 
estimated that it lost 150,000 animals while Prussia and the other German States lost 
more than one million horses, half of which were from disease and poor management.116  
During the course of the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia increased its soldier to horse ratio 
from 1:4 to 1:3.  This meant an increase in the quantities of fodder and grain to feed the 
increased number of horses.117  Both the cavalry and artillery experienced horse shortages 
on both sides.  The French artillery had enough vehicles and guns to mobilize 396 
batteries in 1870 but only had 17,000 of the 52,000 horses it required to complete the 
task.  As a result of the widespread shortages, both cavalry and artillery officers were 
forced to purchase the required animals from the surrounding regions, which rarely went 
smoothly.  Purchasing possessed its own problems including money hording and poor 
selection.118  The shortages would never be fully resolved during the war. 
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Like the wars previously fought, the cavalries of both sides found themselves in 
limbo between the battlefield and the sidelines.  Traditionally, the light regiments of the 
cavalry carried out raids and scouting while the heavy regiments ran down fleeing 
infantry in the last phase of the battle; however, the improvements in rifles doomed these 
tactics, though both armies continued to attempt them during the war.119  The French 
cavalry refused to change with the progress of weapons and rose into battle “gaily 
uniformed” in massed squadrons.  The Prussians, on the other hand, wore plain uniforms.  
The French Army also expected the cavalrymen to supply their own mounts while the 
Prussian government provided the horses, making the Prussian cavalry less a traditionally 
aristocratic organization.120  The chronic horse shortages retarded the mobilization of 
both sides because men had to be sent into the countryside to acquire the much needed 
animals.121  The Prussian cavalry attempted to reform themselves by instituting new 
tactics such as encircling the enemy and clinging to him as he advanced.  The Prussian 
Army also was used their cavalry as advance guards, rear guards, and escorts as well as 
continuing their traditional role in reconnaissance.122  Many cavalry reformers called for 
the conversion of both the light and heavy regiments into mounted infantry units; 
however, few European armies “heeded to call.”123  Cavalry charges became absurd 
because of the improved firepower of rifles.  Charges had to be started at further and 
further distance to limit the effectiveness of the rifles; horses were, thus, exhausted by the 
time they reached the enemy 1,000 to 2,000 yards away.124  Because of the long distance 
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artillery pieces, both cavalries decided it was best to employ their forces on the flanks 
rather than in head on charges.  Frontal changes were deemed as “wasting our courage in 
this useless manner.”125  One of the last successful cavalry charges of the modern age was 
known as “Von Bredow’s Death Ride.”  Von Bredow’s men approached French batteries 
outside of Vionville and surprised the unorganized French soldiers.  Despite their initial 
success, the Prussian cavalry overran the French gun line and clashed with two brigades 
of French cavalry.  The survivors retreated through a hail of fire to their own line with 
only half of their original 800 men.126  The developments in technology ended the cavalry 
charge after the war, but that did not keep commanders from clinging to the tradition well 
into the twentieth century. 
One of the advancements that did signal the decline of the war horse was the 
improvement in firepower.  This improvement can be divided into two categories:  
firearms and machine guns.  Firearms began to improve over their Napoleonic 
predecessors in the 1850s with the repeater rifle and hand gun.127  Previously the 
Napoleonic muskets were only accurate to 300 feet while the newer breech-loading rifles 
of the 1860s and 1870s were accurate to 1,000 to 3,000 feet.128  The newer breech-
loading rifles also allowed soldiers to reload at a faster rate.  The higher accuracy rate and 
the quicker loading time made cavalry units more vulnerable during charges.  These 
better firearms also gave nervous infantrymen an added dose of courage, making the 
shock tactic of the charge less effective.  The other improvement in firearms was the 
invention of the machine gun.  The first machine gun was the Belgian mitrailleuse, which 
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was invented in 1851.  The most famous machine gun was the Gatling gun, which was 
invented in 1861 by the American Dr. Richard Gatling.  The Gatling gun was a rotating, 
hand-cranked weapon capable of firing 200 bullets a minute.129  In the late 1860s, the 
Belgians made improvements to the mitrailleuse, creating the very successful Montigny 
mitrailleuse version.  The French Army preferred to use the Montigny mitrailleuse during 
the Franco-Prussian War.130   
After the Franco-Prussian War, an “equine crisis” occurred through Europe and 
the British Isles from the large quantities of horseflesh purchased and destroyed during 
the conflict.  This massive shortage created an opening for North American breeders, 
who began supplying Britain and the rest of Europe with fresh stock.  Between 1895 and 
1900, Britain received approximately eighty percent of its horse imports from Canada 
and the United States.  The Franco-Prussian War itself had grave effects on Europe.  The 
outcome of the war sparked a deep hatred between France and Germany, which led to 
forming of alliances throughout the continent.  These alliances as well as many other 
tensions between the nations of Europe changed the course of world history in the form 
of the First World War. 
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The Anglo-Boer War:  Mounted Cavalry  
Command the World’s Attention, 1899-1902 
The open warfare of the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa influenced the view 
many future British commanders held about the employment of the cavalries in Europe.  
This conflict also showed the limits of the horse in modern warfare both in acquisition 
and maintenance of the British horse population in another hemisphere.  The Anglo-Boer 
War is actually the second conflict in the region between the British and the Boers.  The 
first conflict lasted from 1880 to 1881 and is also known as the Transvaal War.  The 
Anglo-Boer War began in October 1899 and lasted until May 1902.  In 1899, the British 
Empire declared war on the two major Boer Republics in South Africa, i.e. the Orange 
Free State and Transvaal Republic.  War declared after the British Government sent an 
ultimatum to the Boers Republics ordering the Boers to recognize the equality of the new 
South African population of uitlanders, foreigners mostly of British heritage who 
migrated to the region to work in the gold mines of Transvaal.  The Anglo-Boer War 
lasted until May 1902 and the British victory resulted in the annexation of the two Boer 
Republics to the British Empire.  The Anglo-Boer War was the first conflict to use both 
modern tactics as well as modern technologies against a less advanced region.  The 
British amassed an enormous horse population in South Africa during the war as well as 
employed the automobile in the conflict.  The war heavily influenced the fighting of the 
First World War as well as signaled the slow death of the horse cavalry in Europe and 
America. 
 In his treatise on the British war horse in the Anglo-Boer War, Rimmington stated 
that “the commander must suit his campaign to his horses, not his horses to his 
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campaign;” however, the British military once again refused to do just that.131  As with 
all wars, the Anglo-Boer War was “bedeviled” by the hydrea of transportation:  trains and 
livestock.132  The British Army shipped thousands of horses to South Africa to fight the 
rebelling Boers and just like during the Crimean War, the horses were unloaded at the 
docks or made to swim ashore before being collected in a stockyard.133  After the 
stockyards, the horses were loaded onto the main railway and transported to the front for 
employment.  The number of horses that passed through this remount system was 
extraordinary.  The British Army tended to “swallow horses as a modern army swallows 
petrol.”134  Because of the massive wastage, the British Army created the Army 
Veterinary Department in 1878 and in 1892 it provided one “Sick Horse Hospital” to 
accompany every Army Corps in South Africa.  These hospitals had a 300 horse capacity 
and were stationed at the rear.  The hospital also acted as the Corps’s remount depot.135  
The imported horses suffered from local diseases, which prompted the British Army to 
also use the hardier local animals.136  During the course of the war, the British lost most 
of their horses due to starvation, disease, and overexertion.137  Rimmington believed that 
teaching British soldiers the “art of good horse management” would save the British 
Army “many millions of pounds and the horrible cruelties to animals who are our best 
friends and allies in war.”138 
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 With the British Army racing through its remount resources, it needed to purchase 
large quantities of horse-flesh and ship them to South Africa.  Since “the efficiency of the 
cavalry depend[ed] upon their horses” it was believed that the purchasers needed to 
specialize in buying horses.139  Rimmington states that the British had been misinformed 
about the horse supply in South Africa and, therefore, believed it needed to import all of 
its required horse population.  At the start of the war, it was believed that South Africa 
offered few horses and of the ones available, none would be of use to the British Army.  
Thus, the Army decided to purchase itself remounts from locals as well of other 
countries.140  Remounts were purchased in many different countries including Hungary, 
Canada, the United States, Argentine, and Australia.141  Rimmington estimated that the 
Boers actually possessed three mounts for each of its 70,000 men, or approximately 
210,000 horses.  Rimmington states that “I think I may fairly say that we were 
unprepared and mistaken in our estimate of there being no horses in South Africa.”142   
 At the beginning of the war, the British determined that the Army would lose at 
minimum one-third of its horse population during the course of the conflict.143  The 
British Cavalry fought the war with carbines and sabers as well as lancers on occasion; 
however, as the war dragged on the British Cavalry was forced to temporarily adopt the 
mounted infantry approach, using rifles rather than the traditional cavalry weapons.144  
The Boers, on the other hand, knew their smaller horses would never defeat the British in 
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traditional warfare, so they adopted mounted guerrilla warfare.145  Because the Boers 
preferred guerilla warfare, the British Cavalry spent much of its time waiting for an 
opportunity to perform the traditional cavalry charge.  Because the cavalry could not 
point to either success or failure during the war, its commanders believed that the warfare 
in South Africa to be a fluke and would not be repeated in the future; therefore, they 
continued to emphasize the arme blanche style of fighting over the adopted tactics of 
mounted infantry.146  Because of this traditional mentality, the British commanders 
believed that had the Boers used the traditional form of cavalry tactics, they might have 
been more successful.147  An unusual byproduct of the war was that British gray horses 
were camouflaged with a zebra-like effect so that the Boers would have more difficulty 
see them at a distance.148  This illustrates how important the horse still was to the British. 
 At the beginning of the war, the British Army estimated that it would need five 
percent of the total horse strength each month in replacements.  In November 1899, only 
125 cavalry horses and 250 mules were believed to the needed to fill this quota; however, 
as more and more units were called up, the monthly requisition was duly increased.  By 
January 1902, the British Army required 14,000 horses and 2,000 mules a month.149  
After the close of the war, it was estimated that one-tenth of the total cost of the war was 
horse-flesh.150  From 1899 to 1902, the British shipped over 800,000 people and 420,000 
animals.151  Of the number of animals, 309,000 were horses.152  Most of the horse losses 
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for the British Army were caused by poor management.  A total of 326,000 of the total 
494,000 horses employed by the British Army were lost during the war with only a small 
portion being the result of enemy fire.153  Despite shipping a few lorries to South Africa 
during the war, the British Army remained dependent on the horse to transport supplies, 
artillery, and soldiers.154 
 None of the European Powers adopted the cavalry lessons of the Anglo-Boer 
War.  They all remained utterly committed to Napoleon’s idea of arme blanche.  Even 
during the Manchurian War, the Russians firmly believed that the cavalry with the most 
offensive spirit would decide the outcome of the war.155  In 1905, Sir John French even 
wrote that “it would never be forgotten that it is only by the employment of ‘shock 
tactics’ and the superior morale of the highly trained horseman wielding sword and lance, 
that decisive success can be attained.”156  In 1909, Sir Douglas Haig also wrote that while 
charges may be fewer in future battles, the army must keep the cavalry for when the 
opportunity arises, they will result in decisive success.  Thus, “the mounted attack must 
always be our ideal, our final objective.”157  During the First World War, both French and 
Haig held to their beliefs in the cavalry despite the evidence of its limitations during all of 
the conflicts of the Victorian Era. 
The years surrounding the Anglo-Boer War were ones of accelerated 
technological development.  In 1885, Hiram Maxim created a more compact version of 
the machine gun.  The Maxim was smaller and used the power from its recoil to eject and 
chamber shells.  The Maxim was also cooled by water, which was one of the main flaws 
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of the previous models.  Both the Gatling gun and the mitrailleuse overheated easily.  
The Maxim was the first fully automatic machine gun.  All the soldier had to do was load 
the belt, aim, and hold the trigger down.  The Maxim could pour out bullets at the rate of 
500 rounds a minute.158  The final improvement in the machine gun was the Lewis gun.  
In 1913, Colonel Lewis improved on the existing Maxim gun.  The Lewis gun was 
almost exactly like the Maxim except for the fact that the Lewis gun was air cooled.  The 
removal of the bulky water cooling system meant that the new Lewis machine gun was 
much lighter and easier to handle.159 
 The next invention that sparked the decline of the war horse was the automobile.  
The development of electricity gave way to electric streetcars as well as the first 
automobile.  The first car was battery powered; however, by 1889 the electric car was 
being quickly replaced by the first gas powered ones.  Daimler of Germany patented the 
first version of the gas powered automobile in 1885.160  His version only had three 
wheels, while the first four-wheeled was patented in 1889 by Benz in Germany.161  As 
well as producing cars, the auto industry also produced lorries, or trucks, in significant 
numbers.  The first armored car appeared in 1899 as well as 1902.  These cars were 
armed with machine guns and a primitive form of body armor.  However, the European 
armies did not seem to be interested in the armored car until the First World War.162  As 
manufacturing technology improved, society’s interest in the automobile increased both 
on the home front and for the military.  The British Army created the Motor Volunteer 
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Corps in 1903, which attempted to utilize the automobile for military purposes.163  Prior 
to Henry Ford’s invention of the moving assembly line in 1908, automobiles were 
expensive and scarce.  Many people viewed the car as a fad for the rich rather than the 
replacement of the horse.164  However, the moving assembly line decreased the cost of 
production and increased the availability of the car to the public.  In 1910, the British 
possessed 144,000 vehicles and 390,000 by 1914.165  The United States possessed 
175,000 in 1910.166  In comparison, Britain had 1,545,000 horses in 1910.167  With the 
introduction of motorized taxis to the London streets, the London Omnibus Company 
replaced its horses at a rate of 150 a day.168  During the early twentieth century, a 
common sentiment about horses among motorized advocates was that “automobiles can 
be made in a week.  A battleship takes two or three years.  A horse cannot be bred and 
reared and trained so as to be serviceable for hard work, in less than six years, one while 
the mare carries him, three while he grows to an age where his training can begin, two for 
him to mature and complete his education.”169   
Another motorized invention that would in time replace the horse in agriculture 
and in the military was the Caterpillar track-type tractor.  The Holt Brothers of California 
invented the track-type tractor in 1904 and it would later be the inspiration for the British 
tank “Mother” during the First World War.170  The final motorized machine that would 
eventually replace the horse in warfare was airpower.  The two significant developments 
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in airpower was the motorized airplane in 1903 by the Wright Brothers and the airship in 
1904 by Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin.171  These aerial developments would take over 
the role of reconnaissance from the cavalry during the Great War. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE CLASH OF THE TITANS:  THE EUROPEAN WAR HORSE VERSUS 
TECHNOLOGY THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN EUROPE, 1914-1919 
 
The Clash of Muscular Power and Mechanized Power on the Western Front 
“I tell you it is the vilest baseness to use horses in the war.”172  This quotation 
from Remarque’s masterpiece, All Quiet on the Western Front, expresses the feelings 
many soldiers had about the use of horses during the First World War.  Despite this 
opinion, horses were an integral part of the war effort for all of the belligerent nations.  
While the war on the Eastern Front was characterized by mobility and the cavalry 
maneuvers, the Western Front in France and Belgium was defined by stagnation and 
advancing technologies.  The war horse was mainly localized to mundane tasks rather 
than the “noble” cavalry charges of bygone days.  Trench warfare and the technology it 
birthed made the traditional cavalry role obsolete; however, the horse’s primary role as a 
beast of burden remained relatively unchanged until the mechanization of labor entered 
full swing in the postwar period.  The horse’s main role was in transportation especially 
supplies, munitions, messages, weapons, and the dead.  These tasks, though mundane in 
nature, formed the building blocks of an army’s success on the Western Front, especially  
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for the Allied forces.  Because the horse remained a vital asset to the Allied war effort on 
the Western Front, maintaining a healthy population was of the upmost importance; 
included feeding, housing, health services, and the acquiring of replacements. 
Acquiring a European Horse Population 
The first goal for the British army after declaring war was to acquire an adequate 
supply of horse flesh.  Within the first twelve days of the war, the British military 
impressed over 165,000 animals.173  Horses were purchased first from farms and then 
from urban centers as the supply of farm horses thinned out.174  When Britain had 
exhausted their resources the government turned to Canada, Australia, and later America 
for imports.175  By the end of the war in November 1918, it was estimated that America 
provided Britain with close to half a million horses and over a quarter of a million 
mules.176  During the war, the ratio between horses and mules with the British Army on 
the Western front was three to one respectively.177  America was asked to provide three 
different categories of horses: one, cavalry mounts, two, light artillery horses, and three, 
heavy artillery horses.  The categories were based both on the height and weight of the 
animal with cavalry mounts being the shortest and lightest and the heavy artillery animals 
the tallest and heaviest.  America was able to easily supply the artillery horses from its 
large stock of farm horses; however, the United States had difficulty acquiring cavalry 
mounts because “the cavalry horse as we know him in England does not exist in North 
America in any numbers which are appreciable for modern war requirements.”178  
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Imported horses were first sent to Britain for classification and evaluation and then 
shipped to one of the five remount depots in France.  From there the animals were 
disseminated throughout the allied armies on the Western Front.179  By September 1917, 
the United States had over 35,000 trained animals ready for deployment in Europe.180  
Horses were viewed as so important to the war effort that Britain, France, and the United 
States passed luxury taxes on items that were viewed as frivolous in wartime; this 
including taxes on horse races, non-agricultural horse breeds, carriages, and riding 
accessories.181  Nations placed such a high priority on the safety of its horse population 
that many horses were issued gas masks after gas warfare began in 1915.  The 
photograph in Figure 1 shows a cavalryman and his horse preparing for a gas attack on 
the Western Front.182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Role of Horses 
While mechanized machines were available on the Western Front, their numbers 
were very limited, making the horse the primary “machine” of labor for the army.  The 
horse was essential to everything from transportation, artillery, front maintenance, and 
the mounted forces.  With a few exceptions, the taxis of the Marne and tanks after the 
Somme, mechanized machines were relegated to labor far from the front. 
The first role of the horse was in the transportation of supplies to the front.  
Horses transported supplies from the assembly points to the front lines, where few 
machines could travel due to poor road conditions.  Motor trucks transported the supplies 
from the railroads to the assembly, since the railroads rarely traveled close enough to the 
front.  The assembly points usually lay approximately five miles from the front, at which 
time horse-drawn wagons and pack animals carried the supplies the rest of the way.  The 
heavily cratered terrain close in the front had a tendency to become miles of mud after 
rain, making them impassable for everything but horses.183  In some incidences, the 
terrain was almost to poor for horses and their wagons becoming engulfed in the mud like 
in Flanders and at the Somme.  At this point the supplies were unloaded and put on pack 
animals to continue the journey to the front.184  Figure 2 illustrates the use of horses for 
transporting supplies to the front.185 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
The second role of the horse was that of artillery transport.  The artillery of World 
War I grew to sizes of enormous proportion.  With trucks and tractors in short supply on 
the front, horses once again continued their traditional role as artillery transportation.  An 
average six to eight animals, whether draft horses or mules, were used to move a single 
artillery piece.186  Toward the end of the war, military leaders began experimenting with 
self-propelled artillery guns, as well as other mechanical forms of transportation.  This 
slowly began to replace the horse in artillery mobility.  However, the artillery did not 
become fully mechanized in the British or American armies until the end of the inter war 
period.187  Figure 3 shows the harsh conditions that horses faced on the Western Front.  
This image is of horses transporting artillery shells through the mud at the Battle of the 
Somme in 1916.188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
186
  Galtrey, The Horse, 14-15. 
187
  H.G. Bishop,  Field Artillery:  the King of Battles  (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1935), 14. 
188
  Richard Holmes,  The First World War in Photographs  (London:  Imperial War Museum, 2001), 178. 
  48
 
Figure 3 
The third use of horses during World War I was in front maintenance.  This 
classification included everything from maintaining communication lines to repairing 
trenches to maintaining roadways.  The region known as the Western Front was 
originally farmland.  The Allied forces had to construct miles of new roadways to reach 
the front.  Horses transported the stone materials from the quarry trucks to the 
construction area.  By the armistice more than 3,500,000 tons of road material had been 
transported by both motor vehicles and horses to maintain the roads on the Western 
Front.189  Horses were needed to help repair poorly constructed trenches as well.  They 
transported the timber needed for the duckboards at the bottom of soggy trenches as well 
as to carry sandbags to reinforce the crumbling walls.190  Horses also transported wood 
needed to build shelter for the troops.191  In the area of communication, horses laid the 
telephone and telegraph wires from the front to the Allied Headquarters.192  Horses 
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carried messengers when motor vehicles were unable to transverse the poor terrain.193  
The average weekly issue of communication cables was 3,300 miles with as much as 
6,500 miles being built in any given week during the war.194   
The final use of the horse was for the cavalry.  Trench warfare, which 
characterized the Western Front in World War I, did not allow for the traditional use of 
cavalry as shock troops.  This is in strict contrast to the fighting on the Eastern, Middle 
Eastern, and Egyptian fronts, where mounted forces played a key role to the region such 
as T.E. Lawrence in Palestine.  Most cavalry units were kept in reserve as military leaders 
hoped to use them should a break thorough in the lines occur; however, when few gaps 
appeared, the cavalry was reduced to mounted forces, whose steed was only used to move 
the solder from location to location quickly.195  The use of cavalry units was also reduced 
by the employment of the machine gun and barbed wire by the Germans from the outset 
of the trench war.  During the first days of the war in 1914, the British cavalry learned the 
lesson of machine guns quickly when the horses of the 9th Lancers froze in the face of the 
lines and lines of barbed wire in No Man’s Land and were mowed down by machine gun 
fire.196  Cavalry units were also used for reconnaissance missions when airplanes could 
not due to weather issues.197  Figure 4 illustrates the last category of horses during the 
First World War:  the cavalry mount.198 
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Figure 4 
Fodder and Veterinary Corps 
 Horses were purchased first from farms and then from urban centers as the 
supply of farm horses thinned out.199  When Britain had exhausted their resources the 
government turned to Canada, Australia, and later America for imports.200  By the end of 
the war in November 1918, it was estimated that America provided Britain with close to 
half a million horses and over a quarter of a million mules.201 
The logistics of maintaining a large horse population in France proved to be an 
enormous task for the Allies.  Not only did the Allies have to ship the animals from 
Britain to France, and beyond to the Middle East, but they had to maintain the health of 
the animals through proper food and veterinary services.  As previously mentioned, 
horses were transported to France from Britain where they were then sent to remount 
depots.  These remount depots were situated within easy assess to both the railroads and 
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the roadways to the front.202  The British had to import almost all of their fodder, both 
oats and hay, from the British Isles and North America.  Table 1 shows the British 
agricultural output during the Great War, including the output of fodder for the military’s 
animals. 
Table 1:  British farm output structure, 1914-18 
Percent of total output 
 1.909-13 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Cereals and 
potatoes 16.6 16.6 17.3 14.9 18.8 26.1 
Dairy produce 16.8 17.7 17.1 16.6 15.2 13.9 
Livestock 40.5 38.4 38.2 38.8 36 29.8 
Other 26.1 27.3 27.4 29.7 30 30.2 
 
The “other” category is comprised of mostly hay or straw as well as hops, poultry, and 
fruit.  Over the course of the war the percentage of total output for the “other” category 
increased much like the cereals and potato category.  This was due to the increased 
requirements for food and fodder to feed the increased amount of soldiers and horses on 
the numerous battlefronts.  It has been estimated that the British Army that its horses in 
France consumed approximately 70,000 tons of hay a month during 1917.203  Due to the 
high demand for oats and hay at the front, the British home front experienced rationing of 
these particular staples.  The British government even placed restrictions on horse-racing, 
claiming that the race-horses were unnecessarily reducing the fodder supply in the Isles; 
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however, many historians now believe that there was underlying motive behind the 
restrictions.  John Singleton contends that the restrictions were the government’s way of 
assaying “public hostility toward frivolities when men were suffering and dying at the 
front.”204 
Because horses were vital to the war effort, their health was extremely crucial to 
military activities.  Poor health and abusive conditions created massive wastage in 
France.  Britain, and later the United States, created the Veterinary Corps to reduce the 
wastage of animals at the front.  At the beginning of the war, the Royal Army Veterinary 
Corps was comprised of 519 individuals.  By the armistice, the corps had been expanded 
dramatically to 27, 502 individuals.205  This increase in personnel clearly illustrates the 
British Army’s desire to effectively maintain the health of animals at the front as well as 
a general goal of reducing the amount of wastage due to curable diseases and wounds.  
The British Army estimates for the percentage of horse and mule wastage during the 
Great War is located in Table 2, which is below.   
Table 2:  Percentage of Animal Wastage, i.e. Deaths, in the British Army 
 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 Average 
United 
Kingdom 
4.61* 9.98 11.75 15.81 16.3 11.69 
France 12.58* 14.32 14.09 28.5 24.24 18.75 
Egypt NA 11.77 14.2 13.24 11.13 12.6 
Mesopotamia NA NA 1.83^ 8.23 6.02 5.36 
*  only four months of fighting 
^  only three months of fighting 
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The British Army estimated that the replacement of horses employed by civilian firms to 
be twenty percent per year while the Army lost ten percent per year, meaning the Army 
lost fewer animals on average than did the home front.  During the last two years of the 
war, the Veterinary Corps experienced a major influx of animal casualties due to supply 
issues, increased fighting on muddy terrain, and an increase in contagious diseases like 
glanders.  Because of the extreme conditions that the horses at the front faced, they were 
prone to respiratory, skin diseases, and exhaustion. 206 
Mobile veterinary units were usually attached to combat divisions.  Their job was 
to either destroy wounded animals on site or evacuate the casualty to clearing stations for 
further evaluation and emergency treatment.  Stable cases were then evacuated from the 
clearing stations to the main hospitals in horse-drawn ambulances or by motor vehicles.  
In Figure 5, the photograph below, wounded horses are being transported from the front 
to a veterinary hospital by cart.207 
 
Figure 5 
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Gunshot wounds and gas accounted for only a small percentage of the horse 
fatalities.  In contrast, horses usually died from exhaustion and disease.  Due to the 
Veterinary Corps’s valiant efforts, the average wastage percentage for the whole of the 
British Army was under fifteen percent compared to the seventeen percent for the French 
Army and eighty percent during the Crimean War.208  Another way for the British and 
American Armies attempted to reduce the annual waste on the Western Front was to keep 
the front line soldiers from abandoning wounded or sick animals on the side of the road.  
In a memorandum in 1918 to the Veterinary Corps, General John Pershing ordered every 
member of the mobile veterinary sections to evacuate as many of the savable animals as 
possible to designated collecting sections behind the lines before the unit was set to move 
out.  General Pershing also ordered that all of the dead animals be buried immediately 
should the local population not want the carcass.209 
After War Service 
When the war ended on the eleventh of November in 1918, the Veterinary Corps 
job was far from over.  Along with recuperating the animals, the Corps was responsible 
for separating the animals suitable for civilian life back in Britain and United States from 
those selected to be sold off the rest to the local population; this second option was 
known as “casting”.  Between November 1918 and March 1920, the British Army 
transported and sold approximately 140,000 horses in Great Britain, with ninety-five 
percent of those sold for labor.  During that same time, the Army sold close to 238,000 
animals in France and Flanders with eighty-two percent for labor and approximately 
185,000 animals in all of the other theaters of the war, including Egypt and the Middle 
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East with about ninety-two percent of those animals sold for labor.  Of the three major 
zones of auctioning, France purchased the largest amount of cast animals for meat at 
eighteen percent of their total purchased population. In total the British Army sold 
approximately 420,000 animals aboard or seventy-five percent of the war stock.210  The 
United States sold over 177,000 horses and mules in Europe immediately following the 
armistice.211  Despite the huge uproar on the British home front and threats from the 
R.S.P.C.A. to withdraw its support for the war effort, the British Army continued to resell 
their horse population to French farmers and butchers as well as to Egyptians.  The 
British public was outraged at these practices because it was believed that neither country 
could properly care for them.212  As it turned out, the British public’s concern for the 
horsed in Egypt was actually warranted.  In 1930, during a trip to Egypt with her 
husband, Mrs. Dorothy Brooke discovered the terrible living conditions of the former 
British war horses.213  The vast majority were ill or weak from disease, poor feeding, 
overloaded during their work, or completely lame.  In an endeavor to relieve their 
suffering, Dorothy Brookes created the “Old War Horse Fund.”  The purpose of the 
organization was to purchase the remaining stock of war horses in Egypt and fill their 
few remaining years with peace and relaxation.214   She also established the “Old War 
Horse Memorial Hospital” in 1934 for horses as well as all other animals in need of 
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veterinary services.215  In all, Dorothy Brooke’s foundations rescued more than 5,000 war 
horses.216 
Conclusion 
In the years that followed World War I, mechanical machines came to dominate 
both the battle front and the home front.  Improvements in the technology of automobiles, 
tanks, and tractors pushed horse power to the background.  The new, more reliable 
machine came to replace horses and especially the cavalry of all of their military roles.  
The cavalry was no longer needed for reconnaissance of communications and with the 
more powerful automobiles the horse was no longer required for load bearing 
transportation.  By the end of World War II, the only remaining military role for the horse 
was in parades.217  While World War I has been commonly characterized as the first 
modern war because of the use of numerous modern weapons link airplanes, machine 
guns, and tanks, WWI was actually a war dominated by horse power.  Trench war fare 
and the destruction of land it created meant that the war horse would remain an integral 
part of the Allied war effort.  Because of its vitalness at the front, the Allied forces 
devoted a great deal of resources to the maintaining of their horse population on the 
Western Front. 
 
Maintaining the Status Quo on the Eastern Front 
 The experiences of the Eastern Front were far from those of the Western Front.  
The Western Front was a war of attrition and stagnation while the Eastern Front was one 
                                                 
215
  Ibid., 108. 
216
  Ibid., 126. 
217
  Arthur Vernon,  History and Romance of the Horse  (Boston:  Waverly House, 1939), 368. 
  57
of mobility and open warfare.218  The Eastern Front appeared to be primitive in 
comparison to the technology orientated battles of the West.  The Russian and German 
armies fought much like they did in the nineteenth century, with infantries and cavalries.  
The war on the Eastern Front lasted longer than it should have had the German High 
Command not sent only one of its eight armies to fight against the Russian steamroller.219  
Compared to the Western Front, the war in the East was costlier in terms of human life 
during the first two years of the war; however, by 1916 with the battles of Verdun and the 
Somme begun, the West exceeded the loses on the Eastern Front.  By the time Russia 
exited the war in 1918, the Eastern Front had “two-fifths less dead, one-half the number 
of missing, and one-third fewer wounded than the West.”220  Another characteristic of the 
Eastern Front was the severe supply shortages in the Russian Army.  The Russian Army 
chronically was short on food, weapons, clothing, and fodder.  These shortages slowed 
the full Russian mobilization, forcing the Russian Army to send its soldiers into battle 
without the proper equipment or with obsolete equipment.221 
 Unlike the landscape of the Western Front, the lands of Poland, East Prussia, and 
Russia were flat plains without proper drainage systems or a marshy bog like the 
Mazurian Lakes district.   The rivers of the East did not cut deep trenches; thus, during 
the wet seasons, the rivers tended to overflow, adding to the wet environment of the East.  
The wettest of the Eastern Front kept the German and Russian armies from engaging in 
the destructive trench warfare of the West.222  The land of Poland did not provide a large 
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amount of road material; thus the roads of the region were poor and almost impassable 
during the wet seasons.  The land also made it difficult to construct proper railways.223  
Because of the preference for river travel and sled transportation in the winter months, 
road maintenance system was almost nonexistent outside of postal routes.224  The roads 
were “rutted and dry” in the summer and swallowed men, horses, and vehicles when 
wet.225  Just like on the Western Front, horses died like flies in the quagmire of the mud 
from drowning or exhaustion.226 
 As previously stated, the Eastern Front was comparatively technologically 
backwards.  At the start of the war, the Russian Army owned only 679 motorized 
vehicles including 418 tracked vehicles and two ambulances.  To this the army added 418 
privately requisitioned motor cars.227  By the end of 1916, the Russian Army had 12,100 
automobiles, 3,050 motorcycles, and 12,300 bicycles.  To show how much smaller the 
Russian Army’s supply of motorized vehicles, in 1918 the French Army, a force more 
than half the size of the Russian Army, had 90,000 cars alone.228  The Russian air 
supplies were even smaller than the number of motorized vehicles.  Russia had the 
smallest air force of the major powers.  At the beginning of the war, the Russian Army 
only had 263 airplanes, 229 pilots and observers, and 12 balloon companies.  By 
September 1916, the Russians possessed 716 planes and 859 pilots and observers.229  
This is compared to the thousands of pilots and planes owned by the British, French, and 
German forces. 
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 In 1910, when the latest horse census was taken in the Western world, Russia far 
exceeded the rest of Europe in the number of animals it possessed compared to its 
population:  for every 100 inhabitants Britain had 3.6 horses, France had 8.1, Germany 
had 6.9, and Russia had 21.3 horses.  The only western country to beat Russia was the 
United States with 25.0 horses per 100 people.230  Before the war broke out in 1914, the 
Russian Empire possessed 35 million horses.231  The horses of Russia can be divided into 
three categories:  the peasants’ horses, the horses of the nomadic tribes, and the premier 
breeds owned by the wealthy landowners.  86 percent of the 35 million horses were of the 
peasant stock with the remaining 14 percent divided between the nomadic tribes and the 
aristocracy.232  During the course of the war, Russia requisitioned approximately 
2,600,000 horses for military use; that was about ten percent of the mature horse 
population available in the Russian Empire.233  In comparison, the German Army 
employed 715,000 horses on both the Western and Eastern Fronts.234  The military 
requisitions were very hard on the Russian peasant population.  Peasants were ordered to 
present all of their animals for mandatory horse reviews, at which time the Russian Army 
may or may not pay for the animals being requisitioned.  Because the peasants relied on 
their horses for survival, many peasants hid their animals in cellars or in nearby forests to 
avoid the reviews.  At the horse reviews, peasants were forced to accept whatever price 
the army offered them as well as sign papers stating that the sale was entirely 
voluntary.235 
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 Russia hoped to win the war quickly by focusing all of its industrial energy on 
heavy industry; this, created chronic shortages in both consumer goods and basic military 
supplies.236  Unlike the Western powers, Russia did not impose any taxes on horses, 
horse-drawn vehicles, or horse accessories like many of the Western nations did.237  This 
is most likely because the horse drawn military and society of Russia could not afford to 
pay taxes on objects that were crucial to the everyday function of society.  Also, Russia’s 
horse population came mainly from the poorer sections of society; individuals whose 
very survival depended on their horse.  To acquire the necessary animals, supplies, and 
vehicles for the army, the Russian government compensated most peasants for their 
property.  Peasants were paid between 200 and 500 rubles for the property, depending on 
its type and condition.238  With so many horses being purchased or confiscated by the 
Russian Army, the agriculture sector of the nation suffered in various ways including a 
decrease in production as well as a shift in livestock demographics.  The largest group of 
horses in Russia became those under four years of age, those too young to work.239  To 
compound maters in the agriculture sector, 1917 experienced one of the worst harvests in 
decades.240  The poor harvest caused a shortage of food stuff in the major cities, forcing 
citizens to protest in the streets.  The poor harvest is one of the leading causes of the 
Russian Revolutions of 1917. 
 The main uses for horse on the Eastern Front were much like those in the West:  
transportation, communication, and the cavalry.  In 1914, Russia had the largest cavalry 
of all of the belligerent nations.  It was divided into four major groups:  the Guards, the 
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Line, the Cossacks, and the Alien troops.241  On the eve of the war, the Russian cavalry 
numbered 117 regiments of 1,200 men each:  twelve Guards, twenty-one Dragoons, 
seventeen Lancers, eighteen Hussars, forty-one Cossack regiments, three regiments from 
the Caucasus and Turkestan regions, and five regiments of border guards.242  Compared 
to the other warring cavalries, the Russian cavalry was quite well mounted.  The troops 
rode on animals that were more than three-fourths Thoroughbreds, the most coveted 
horse of warfare, for its Arabian qualities and hardiness.  The Russian cavalry took much 
time and consideration to choose the best animals for its cavalry and remount services.243  
On the Eastern Front, the Russian commanders were surprised at the ineffectiveness of 
their cavalry units against the German infantry.  The cavalry units wandered at the front 
barely in contact with one another or the main army.  The information they gathered was 
usually old or incorrect.  The downfall of the cavalry was that the German infantry 
carried some of the most accurate guns of the warring nations.  Their weapons could fire 
fifteen rounds a minute and were accurate at two miles.244  The Russians attempted to 
institute much needed reforms in the spring of 1916.  At first, each cavalry division had 
attached to them an infantry battalion of three dismounted squadrons, but later in the 
year, the Army reduced the mounted strength of the regular cavalry and the Cossack 
cavalry from six to four squadrons each.245  The dismounted men were assigned to the 
infantry.  The remaining mounted cavalrymen were kept waiting behind the front lines 
for a breakthrough, much like the cavalries of the West.246 
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 Though fought on the same continent, the Western and Eastern fronts had little 
similarities.  Technology played a major role on the Western front while the Eastern front 
lagged behind in the nineteenth century.  The one common thread in the war was the 
continued heavy reliance on horses by all of the belligerent nations.  Armies employed 
horses at al levels of warfare during the First World War from transportation to front 
maintenance to the cavalry.  This reliance showed that the Western Powers were not 
ready to give up their ancient supply work force. 
 
The Failure of Technology to Supplant the Horse on the Western Front 
The horse’s mobility, versatility, and large quantities were still highly prized by 
the military leaders of Europe compared to the modern mechanized machines, which 
remained scarce.  The cheapness of the horse both in acquisition and maintenance 
allowed it to remain unsupplanted until the outbreak of the Second World War.  The 
horse remained vital at the front due to the use of trench warfare, the utter destruction of 
the landscape, the scarcity and newness of mechanized machines, and an affinity for the 
creature by the top military leaders such as Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig.  The 
horse continued to be used in its traditional role as a beast of burden as well as a cavalry 
mount, albeit it in a greatly diminished capacity compared to the other theaters of the 
war.  The application of trench warfare, destruction of the landscape on the Western 
Front, and the scarcity of mechanized machines kept technology from supplanting the 
horse during the First World War; thus, making the continued use of horses vital to the 
Allied war effort. 
Technology 
  63
The most important technological advances during the war were the use of the 
automobile, the airplane, and the tank.  The first massive deployment of the automobile 
was in September 1914 when General Joseph Gallieni ordered 1,200 taxi drivers to rush 
6,000 soldiers to the Battle of the Marne.  The following photograph, Figure 6, shows the 
“Miracle of the Marne.”247 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
The automobile and the lorry attempted to replace the horse’s transportation 
responsibilities.  Cars and lorries were used to move supplies and men to and from the 
front as long as the roads permitted them to do so.  If the roads were wet or not located 
close enough to the front, horses were still used to move the supplies the rest of the way.  
At the beginning of the war, the British Army had only eighty motor vehicles.  This force 
had expanded to more than 121,000 vehicles by the end of the war.248  As previously 
stated, the Wright Brothers flew the first motorized airplane in 1903.249  There was a 
relatively quick progression from the Wright Brothers’ Flyer I to the Fokker Bi and 
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Triplanes for the war.  While the first airplanes could barely stay aloft before 1910, the 
combat planes could drop bombs, fly reconnaissance missions, and engage in dog fights 
over the heads hiding in the dirty trenches.  Aces were viewed as ancient knights, fighting 
with honor and a code unto themselves.  These pilots began to replace the cavalry as the 
keepers of tradition, adventure, and honor.250  Airplanes replaced the horse’s duty in 
reconnaissance missions.  The Juggernaut Car of Battle, as one filmmaker called the tank, 
was first tested in February 1916 by the British.251  The tank, which was in the shape of a 
rhombus, could cross flat ground at a rate of 100 to 120 yards per minute and could cross 
the 11 foot wide trenches at a rate of 30 to 40 yards per minute, crushing the wire 
entrenchments as it went.  It could also climb over an obstacle that was five feet high.252  
Figure 7 illustrates the power of the tank over bared wire.253   
 
Figure 7 
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The tank was first deployment during the Battle of the Somme.254  The Germans 
were horrified by this invention and many fled their trenches at their first glimpse of 
them.255  A filmmaker who was filming the Battle of the Somme commented that “Fritz 
must have thought the devil himself had broken loose from hell and was advancing to 
devour him.  The Huns scurried to their funk-holes and craters, their hiding-places, and 
their trenches like so many rabbits.”256  The Germans viewed the tank as a terror weapon 
rather than tactical one and, thus, produced very few during the war.257  The Germans 
were more content to salvage captured British tanks than build their own.258  The British 
and the French would produce more than 6,000 tanks during the course of the war while 
Germany only built twenty.  The United States only produced 84 during the war, but 
preferred to use French machines when necessary.259  The tank acted as the new cavalry 
during the war.  It attempted to breach the trenches in much the same way that Sir Haig 
had hoped the cavalry would do. 
Friends in High Places 
 During the Great War, the horse had the adoration and loyalty of many of the 
military leaders, the most famous of which were Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig.  
Sir John French was the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces till 
1915.  Prior to his promotion, Sir French was originally trained as a cavalryman and 
fought as such during the Boer War.  Though his promotion to the position of Field-
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Marshal meant he could no longer be a cavalryman on the battlefield, Sir French 
continued to value the use of the British cavalry in modern warfare.  According to his 
son, Sir John French devoted much of his life to the “study of cavalry and its 
employment in war” and was a “staunch upholder of the "cavalry spirit," 
[believing] the fostering of this spirit to be an essential part of a cavalryman's 
training.”260  Like French, Douglas Haig trained as a cavalryman prior to his promotion to 
General.  After French returned to Britain to command the British Home Forces, Haig 
was promoted to the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces on the Western Front.  
Haig was convinced that the cavalry would be needed to conquer the trenches once a 
breach was made, thus, he positioned thousands of cavalrymen just behind the front lines 
to wait for just such a breakthrough.261  In his war diaries, Haig exalted the deployment of 
the cavalry and remarked numerous times that all his cavalry needed was a breakthrough 
to claim victory over the Germans.262  And while Haig preferred to use horses in warfare, 
he was open to the use of mechanized machines in battles, when they were available.  
Toward the end of the war, Haig argued that horses were more versatile than motor 
vehicles because they can “operate in the dark and in bad weather.”263  Haig was for 
mobility not cavalry.  He was open to the use of other mobile arms such as tanks and 
bicycles; however, the limited supply of motorized vehicles forced Haig to continue to 
use the horse on the battlefield.  General Galtrey was also very partial to the use of horses 
in war, the cavalry especially.  He commented that “In my opinion the day must come in 
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the closing stages of the war when cavalry will play its own great part. It will operate at 
the end as it did at the beginning but with this difference, that cavalry when used in an 
advance in conjunction with modern methods and engines of war must be more vitally 
important and essential than when used in defence.”264  All of these military leaders, as 
well as many others, felt that the horse was just more reliable than a motorized vehicle on 
the Western Front.  General H.G. Bishop summed up the belief of many military leaders 
during the First World War best when he wrote: 
Until the gasoline replacement comes up, the motor is riveted in place; but 
with the horse, a little rest, a little water, a little stubble from the roadside 
or bark from the trees, a little chafing of palsied muscles, oftentimes just a 
little petting — and the forward march can be resumed.  Another 
predominating reason is the fact that no motor vehicle has yet been 
produced which can replace the horse on individual work, such as 
scouting, wire-laying, line-riding, and messenger service, over rough, 
heavily wooded, or marshy ground.265   
 
General Ludendorff wrote at length about his concerns for his army’s horse 
population.  He worried that his horses were not receiving the proper food and 
shelter at the front and that the fodder and oat were scarce most of the time.266  On 
numerous occasions, Ludendorff wrote in his memoir that we wrote the Army 
Headquarters Staffs complaining about the poor treatment of the horses, suggesting 
that “they should devote more care and attention to their horses.”267 
There were a few dissenting voices in the British Army, though.  The most 
famous being the voice and ideas of J.F.C. Fuller, an officer and a strategist during the 
Great War.  He was first assigned to the Machine-Gun Corps and then the Tank Corps.  
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Fuller later became known as an early theorist of modern mechanized warfare, 
particularly noted for his philosophy on the use of tanks.  Fuller believed that tanks 
should be used as shock troops, like the heavy cavalry under Napoleon I.268  He also 
contends that “as the mobility of the tank increases so must it be realized that the 
opportunities of using tanks as mechanized cavalry can become greater and greater.”269  
Finally, Fuller predicted that airplanes and tanks would develop a similar relationship that 
the cavalry and the infantry had throughout the centuries.270  Fuller’s ideas greatly 
influenced the mechanization of the European and American Armies during the Interwar 
period.  His tank tactics became the foundation for the use of tanks on the Western Front 
during the Second World War.  Another proponent of mechanization in the war was the 
British Prime Minister Lord Asquith.  Asquith argued with Haig constantly over the large 
horse population being maintained in Europe by the British Army.  He wrote that “they 
were only there for prospective use when we had broken through.  We are maintaining in 
France an enormous number of horses which [are] temporarily useless.”271 
Trench Warfare and Technology 
After advancing through Belgium using the Schlieffen Plan, the German Army 
was halted 30 miles outside of Paris at the First Battle of the Marne in early September 
1914.  The Allies and Germany thus began the “Race to the Sea,” a frantic competition to 
out maneuver one’s enemy before they reached the English Channel.  This line of 
trenches stretched 475 miles from the North Sea to the frontier of Switzerland.272  With 
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both sides unable to find a gap in their enemies’ defenses, the massive armies dug in and 
spent the next four years fighting over the same region of battleground with neither 
gaining more than a few miles in either direction.  The type of fighting that characterized 
the Western Front has come to be known as “trench warfare.”  This type of warfare 
involves lines of hand-dug trenches from which the soldiers shot or charged across No 
Man’s Land to capture the enemies’ line of trenches.  With the armies fully entrenched on 
the Western Front, the belligerent nations employed various new and novel technologies 
in an attempt to gain ground and the advantage.  These innovations included but were not 
limited to:  machine guns, gas, flamethrowers, airplanes and zeppelins, automobiles, 
tanks, massive artillery (in both size and amount), and grenades.  Horses were mainly 
ineffective on the Western Front because of machine gun fire and the barbed wire that 
lined No Man’s Land.  Barbed wire was normally laid at two levels:  one too high for the 
horses to jump over and one strung low to trip them.273 
 Unlike the open warfare of the East Front, trench warfare was a vile, dirty, and 
intensely stressful experience.  The trenches rarely had proper drainage to combat rain 
or snow and what shelter that did exist could collapse at a moment’s notice due to the 
shelling.  While the trenches might have some form of drainage system, No Man’s Land 
did not.  This strip of battlefield usually had been blasted clean of all vegetation by the 
artillery barrages, leaving a crater-pocked landscape deadly both from the enemy’s guns 
and the muddy swamp that arose after precipitation.  The constant exposure to mud, the 
dead, lice, disease, shelling, and constant fear created apathy, cynicism, and even 
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shellshock in some cases.  Through all of the chaos on the Western Front, horses were 
employed to keep the armies running when the new motorized vehicles could not.   
Destruction of Land by the War Effort 
On the Western Front, the British Army controlled the Northern portion of the 
trench lines including Northern France and Flanders.  With respect to terrain, this region 
is particularly prone to large amounts of rainfall and is generally located at sea level, or 
even below it in some regions.  The only season that did not experience rain and mud in 
this area was the summer.274  The rivers in this area had to be diked to prevent flooding in 
the wet seasons.  There also existed a system of close-set canals to help drain the 
permanent groundwater of the marshy regions.275  The frequent rains turned the trenches 
into “muddy bogs” and the soldiers had to place duckboards on the bottom of the 
trenches to escape the water; this was rarely a permanent solution since the water level 
rose and fell depending on the weather.  The soldiers constantly ran the risk of slipping 
off the duckboards and developing trench foot.276  To add to the poor terrain, the artillery 
barrages scarred the land beyond recognition.  The land was pockmarked and the 
drainage system of the region destroyed.  This reduced the once fertile farmland to a 
massive swamp.277  This quagmire wrecked havoc on the soldiers, vehicles, and horses 
stationed at the front.  General Sidney Galtrey observed that it was “a land of horrors 
underfoot, the whole drab face of the earth nothing now but a racked and scourged wilderness 
of shuddering pits and water-laden shell holes.”278  Men, vehicles, and horses regularly were 
pushed to the breaking point at the front and when the weather and the terrain were less 
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than hospitable, they sank into the muddy ground, dying where they stood from exhaustion 
and drowning. 
Mechanical Problems at the Front 
The First World War was the first war in which motor vehicles played a major 
role in warfare.  Two main reasons caused the rise of mechanization on the Western 
front:  the first reason was the desire to implement the new civilian technologies of 
automobiles and trucks to the mundane daily work such as supply transportation and the 
second reason was the belief that the dying of animals was adversely affecting the 
soldiers’ morale.  Many servicemen developed close bonds with their animals and could 
become quite despondent at their deaths.279  This affection is best illustrated in Figure 9, 
the famous painting “Goodbye, Old Man” by Fortunino Matania, in which a serviceman 
cradles his dying horse as his comrades order him to move out.  The painting was 
originally commissioned by the Blue Cross to raise money to relieve the suffering of 
animals on the Western Front.280   
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Figure 8 
Motorcycles, automobiles, buses, airplanes, tanks, and tractors relieved the horse 
of many of its traditional employments including reconnaissance, communication, and 
transportation.281  British leaders also wanted to endow their artillery with the increased 
mobility that motorized vehicles offered.  As the war progressed, the artillery units began 
to experiment with different modes of motor-propulsion, in hopes of supplanting the 
horse as the primary mover of the field guns.282  These experiments included three types 
of motorization.  The first type of motorization was a gun mounted to a self-propelled 
chassis.  The second type was truck-drawn artillery pieces.  The last type was the use of a 
tractor to pull the pieces into position.283  Figure 10 illustrates one of the many uses of 
motor vehicles in France.  This is a photograph of an ambulance bus.284 
                                                 
281
  Arthur Vernon,  History and Romance of the Horse  (Boston:  Waverly House, 1939), 368. 
282
  Boyd Dastrup,  The Field Artillery History and Sourcebook  (Westport, CN:  Greenwood Press, 1994), 
49. 
283
  Bishop, Kings of Battles, 68-69. 
284
  Sheffield,  War on the Western Front, 89. 
  73
While mechanization was making an appearance on the battlefields of France, the 
British Home Islands were also experiencing a rise in mechanization due to the scarcity 
of horses in the towns and on the farms.  With the British government impressing over 
467,000 animals from Britain alone, farmers and urban centers experienced a heightened 
need for other sources of transportation and labor.  In the cities, the horse shortage was 
relieved by the use of automobiles, omnibuses, vans, and lorries.  On farms, the wealthier 
farmers purchased tractors while the poorer farmers used their breeding mares for field 
work.285  Prior to the war, the caterpillar tractor was in its infancy.  It has been estimated 
that only about 1,000 tractors were in use in the British Isles before 1914.  At the end of 
1917, the Food Production Department calculated there to be around 3,500 privately 
owned tractors in Great Britain.  The first government tractor census was in 1925; the 
census found that 16,681 tractors were employed in the region.  From 1917 to 1925, the 
use of the tractor increased five fold.286  The scarcity of horses on the home front was so 
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acute that even the London Times wrote an article on the ways for farmers to deal with 
the limited horse reserves.  In the 26 April 1915 article, entitled “The Horse Supply- 
Years of Scarcity in Prospect- Opportunity for Farmers,” the London Times encouraged 
farmers to use their breeding mares for both breeding and ploughing.  The London Times 
also suggested that farmers should increase their breeding practices to reap the rewards 
for “replenishing the hunting stables.”287 
Despite the fact that motorized vehicles played a major role on the Western Front, 
they proved too fragile and too limited in numbers to effectively supplant the horse in the 
Great War.  General Galtrey answered home front civilians with this statement: 
I have heard folk at home express astonishment that horses and mules are 
still a vital force in the prosecution of modem warfare. The motor lorry, 
the steam wagon and the caterpillar tractors, they say, must have 
supplanted the horse.  We have to remember that this is a unique war of 
enormous, unparalleled magnitude, and that horses are being employed on 
a scale which could never have been dreamed of. They must still continue 
to do what motors cannot do until the time comes when war will be made 
wholly in the sky and under the earth.288 
 
As of the armistice, the British Army estimated that it had employed 121,702 motor 
vehicles during the course of the war including lorries, cars/vans, ambulances, and 
motorcycles.289  By the end of the war, the British Army had requisitioned just under 
900,000 horses and mules for the war effort.290  Horses outnumbered motorized vehicles 
in a ratio of approximately seven to one.  Of the 121,702 vehicles employed by the 
British Army, Britain manufactured 2,818 tanks between 1916 and 1918.291  As the 
statistics show, motorized vehicles were available for the use on the battlefield; however, 
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their technology was relatively new, their production on the home front was limited, and 
very few soldiers knew how to repair them in the field.292  Also, motorized vehicles 
rarely could defeat the massive amounts of water and mud on the Western Front.  Figure 
11 illustrates how many vehicles, including tanks, became stuck in the mud of Flanders 
and the Somme.293 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Production was limited by many factors.  To meet the demands of the British 
Army, new factories were built while older ones were expanded.  Britain also had to 
import most of the raw materials needed to manufacture the vehicles.  The importation 
of the raw materials created massive delays in production due to the increased shipping 
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time across the Atlantic Ocean.  The average shipping time prior to the war was twenty 
days; however, the submarine warfare and lack of convey ships created delays of more 
than two months.  Another factor that added to production delays was the shortage of 
factory workers in Great Britain.  The war had removed a large portion of the male 
population including factory and shipyard workers.  Though women were employed to 
cover the vacant positions, it proved to not be enough in terms of decreasing production 
times.  The government suggested transferring workers from one factory to another, 
thus, allowed them to work more than eight hours a day.  However, this idea fell flat due 
to trade union protests and workers refusing to be transferred.  Trade unions were the 
biggest problem for the British war effort because the members refused to suspend their 
hard-won union privileges; this made it almost impossible for the government to place 
semiskilled workers into the factories.294  Because of the scarcity of motorized vehicles 
and the difficult terrain, generals at the front were forced to continue using horses for 
transportation etc. with little progress in breaking the stalemate. 
Conclusion 
Horses remained a vital part of the British war effort due to their mobility, 
versatility, Army traditions, and the scarcity of motorized vehicles.  While the available 
vehicles did relieve the horse of a few of its uses like reconnaissance and transportation; 
however, the horse remained essential at the front, where few vehicles could easily travel.  
The swampy terrain of Northwestern Europe forced vehicles into positions relatively far 
from the battle lines, while the horses were able to navigate the poor conditions near the 
trenches.  While World War I has been commonly characterized as the first modern war 
because of the use of numerous modern weapons including airplanes, machine guns, and 
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tanks, WWI was actually a war dominated by horse power.  Trench warfare and the 
destruction of land it created meant that the war horse would remain an integral part of 
the Allied war effort.  And while many soldiers found the use of horses to be vile and 
inhumane, its reliability in the face of harsh weather conditions and inhospitable terrain 
made the horse the greatest mobile asset of the Allied forces.  The horse would remain in 
use in the military until after the Second World War when factories were able to finally 
produce machines quickly on an enormous scale.  Though the Second World War was 
almost completely mechanized on the Western Front, the German and Soviet fighting on 
the Eastern Front utilized horses more than machines due to the extreme weather, which 
caused the machines to freeze and breakdown.  The history of mechanized warfare is 
short in comparison to the history of horses in war; however, in a few decades 
mechanized machines completely supplanted the horse, fulfilling the hopes of World War 
One officers like J.F.C. Fuller.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE FALL OF THE EUROPEAN WAR HORSE  
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1945 
 
The Second World War ended the reign of the horse in warfare in a matter of six 
years.  The war began on 1 September 1939 when Hitler’s Army invaded Poland, after 
years of appeasement and indecision by the Britain and France.  In the summer of 1940, 
Germany violated its nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union and invaded the western 
Soviet territories.  The United States joined the Second World War after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor in December 1941.  The war in Europe ended in May 1945 while the war 
with Japan ended the following August after the atomic bombs were dropped.  The 
Second World War heralded the final death throw of the war horse on the Western Front.  
The art of total war on the Western Front made it impossible for the war horse to 
maintain its foothold on the war front.  The Eastern Front, both in Poland and Russia, 
exhibited a very different experience, one of snow, tanks, and millions of horses lined up 
before the guns. 
 
The Horseless Age:  the Mechanization of the West during the Interwar Period 
In his pursuit of mechanization, Fuller stated that “the overall result for the nation  
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adopting mechanization and tankization would be a great savings in war expenditures, 
economy in transport and speed in striking power and hence tactical superiority on the 
battlefield.”295  During the Interwar period, the major Western Powers attempted to 
mechanize following Fuller’s principles.  In the United States, the Tank Corps 
disappeared under the National Defense Act of 1920.  The two battalion commanders, 
George S. Patton, Jr., and Dwight D. Eisenhower, returned to the cavalry and infantry 
respectively.  The Tank Corps was attached to the infantry rather than remaining a 
standalone organization.  European forces, on the other hand, explored new ways of using 
tanks to combine firepower and mobility.296  The infantry continued to see the tank as a 
supporting weapon.  Some senior cavalry officers welcomed mechanization because of 
the lessons of the Western Front.  The cavalry reformers created an experimental 
mechanized brigade in 1933 built around light tanks.297  However, there were still strong 
defenders of the horse cavalry including Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins.  He 
wrote in 1931 “that mechanized force could never replace horse cavalry in any terrain,” 
but he agreed that a combination of the two would be beneficial.298  In 1933, the Horse-
Mechanized Corps Reconnaissance Regiments was created and combined the advantages 
of both means of transportation.  Men and horses could be loaded on a truck and its trailer 
and transported quickly over roads and then unloaded to scout cross-county.299  Patton as 
well as other American generals still wished for the use of horses, but during the Interwar 
period, it was quickly phased out and replaced with “tanks for assault and motorcycles 
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for scouting.”  Horse proponents still championed the horse for rough terrain, but their 
opinions went unheard.300  General Patton stated that “against motorized and mechanized 
armies, vehicular reconnaissance is adequate. If we were to fight opponents who 
depended on animal transportation or their feet, horse reconnaissance would be 
necessary.”301  During the Interwar period, Patton argued that no one could make 
judgments on the use of the future of the United States cavalry because it was not 
deployed during the recent war in Europe.302  The cavalry supporters did, however, make 
numerous attempts to distance the US cavalry from the failures of the European cavalries 
during the war, stating that the American cavalryman was more akin to the dragoon than 
the traditional shock action cuirassier force.303   
New technological developments during the Interwar period began changing 
Patton’s mind on the use of tanks in the cavalry.  In 1928, the new, faster Christie tank 
prototypes appeared in the US military.  Their speed and agility rivaled the traditional 
advantages of the war horse.  Patton could no longer totally believe in his earlier 
statement that “at present there is no tank… which can keep up with Cavalry.”304  
Another event that changed many minds of horse proponents was the Spanish Civil War 
of 1936-1939.  Tanks and airplanes played a major role in the war, but very few horses 
were used during the entire conflict.305  By the start of the Second World War, Patton as 
well as many other supporters of the horse had begun to embrace the tank.  Once he took 
over his own tank army, Patton began to exalt the advantages of the tank in warfare; 
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however, he was unable to completely remove his previous affinity for the war horse.  He 
had the habit of referring to his tanks in anthropomorphic terms and he routinely 
attempted to instill a romantic aura onto the tank that had been previously enjoyed by the 
war horse.306  The final appearance of a mounted cavalry force was in 1940 and 1941 at 
the Louisiana maneuvers.307  Despite the lack of horses in the Western Armies, Germany 
continued to plan for the use of horses on all fronts.  The German Army believed that the 
invasion of England, aka Operation Sea Lion, which was set for August 1940, would 
require a horse strength of 60,000.308 
In Britain, the 5th Cavalry Brigade, or the Household Brigade as it was called, 
was the only one spared mechanization before the Second World War.309  At the outbreak 
of the Second World War, the British Army was the only completely mechanized force in 
the world.310  The French Army still had three cavalry divisions and five light cavalry 
divisions prior to the Fall of France.311  The American Army was the first in the world to 
become fully motorized because the British chose to keep its Household Brigade 
mounted.312  America did purchase approximately 40,000 horses before the war but only 
shipped forty-nine horses overseas while the rest were sold off rather quickly.313  During 
the war, the purpose of the Remount Service in the United States was liquidation rather 
than procurement.314  The United States War Department sold all of its horse and cavalry 
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equipment.315  The Second World War reversed the general opinion of the cavalry.  The 
cavalry was accused of living in the days of King Arthur and became the butt of many 
jokes with the US forces.  Once a position of honor and respect, by the Second World 
War, the cavalry was jeered at by the once lowly infantry soldiers for their old-fashioned 
ways.316  US Intelligence repeatedly showed that Germany and the Soviet Union were 
still relying on the horse.  One US document stated that “horses are playing a most 
important part and will continue to. The largest and to date most successful armies in 
Europe and Asia have been and are using horses on a large scale.” The US Military even 
had figures on the German horse population stating that “in Poland, Germany used more 
than 200,000 horses, and when she overcame France she had almost 800,000 horses in 
her armed forces. It is reported that practically all German artillery is horse drawn.”  
Also, it is known that Germany advertised for and probably purchased all available 
horses in France, for use in Russia.317  Based on the evidence of the German and Soviet 
armies, Kooster advised that the US should keep a small number of horses on hand just in 
case they were needed as they seemed to be on the eastern Front.318  However, despite 
Kooster’s advise, the US Army refused to return to horse-drawn days, except in Italy 
when local mules were needed to carry supplies up mountainous terrain.319 
The US Army encountered few horses on the march to the Reich.  The most 
unusual experience came during the last few days of the war in Europe.  Upon entering 
Austria, Patton’s 3rd Army was welcomed by a magnificent surprise: a cache of top-
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quality and highly prized horses owned by the German Government including the 
Lipizzaners.  In a famous photograph, General Patton rides a Lipizzaner named Favory 
Africa, which Adolph Hitler had personally picked out to be a present for the Emperor 
Hirohito of Japan.  Patton’s drive into Austria most likely saved the Lipizzaners from 
capture by the Soviets.320  In October 1945, the United States shipped 152 top-quality 
horses selected from the hundreds available at the German depots and breeding farms.  
This group included sixty-five Thoroughbreds, twenty-two pure Arabians, fifteen Anglo 
Arabians, nine Lipizzaners, forty Half-Breeds and one Russian stallion.  These animals 
were nicknamed the “Prizes of War” and they toured the country as spoils of war.321  In 
September 1946, an additional 300 horses are brought from Europe as "Prizes of War" 
and included European Thoroughbreds, Half-Breeds, Anglo-Arabs, Arabians, and 
Lipizzaners.”322 
 
The “De-Modernization” of the Eastern Front by the German and Soviet Forces 
Like during the First World War, the wars on the Eastern and Western fronts had 
little common.  The major difference was the extent of the mechanization.  The war in the 
East had far less mechanization than in the West.  This affected the way that the war 
between Germany and the Soviet Union was fought for five years.  “The Soviet Army on 
the eve of war included four cavalry corps and thirteen cavalry divisions totaling 80,000 
men.323  Germany planned a three-prong attack on the Soviet Union:  in the North, in the 
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Center, and in the South.324  One-third of the German infantry divisions remained in 
Western and Southern Europe in 1941, providing two-thirds of its total fighting force for 
the war on the Eastern Front.325  The average Soviet division employed between 35,000 
and 40,000 horses during a campaign.326  In 1938, the Red Army had only one Army 
composed of seven Cavalry Corps and Four Tank Corps.  By 1941 the Soviet Union had 
twenty Armies with only four Cavalry Corps but no Tank Corps.  While the number of 
Tank Corps declined, the number of Tank Divisions increased from zero to 61.  The Red 
Army went from zero mechanized divisions in 1938 to 31 in 1941, showing an attempt at 
increased mechanization.327 
As with the First World War, Russian terrain dictated the pace of war on the 
Eastern Front.  It is a vast region where every type of terrain can be found.  It contains 
icy, snowy regions; hot, dry, sandy deserts; fertile steppes as well as swamps, extensive 
forests, seemingly unending expanses of flat plain and high mountain ranges.328  Forests, 
moors, and marshes covered four-fifths of the entire surface area.329  In the summer, the 
land was open and friendly, but in spring and fall it sank into the mud, and in winter it 
turned to ice and snow.330  The Soviet Union is a land of extremes, which wreaked havoc 
on military horse populations, who were not well suited to the extreme weather.331 
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In 1933, the German Army had only ten obsolete divisions.  By 1939, it had fifty-
five divisions, only fourteen of which were fully mechanized.332  After mobilization, the 
Germany Army possessed 106 divisions; however, it had not fully mechanized any more 
than the previous fourteen.333  Each infantry division was comprised of 17,000 men, 
4,700 horses, 1,000 motor vehicles, and 500 motorcycles.  Before the invasion of Poland, 
the German Army possessed 2,740,000 men, 514,000 horses, 183,000 motor vehicles, 
and 94,000 motorcycles.334  Operation Barbarossa involved the amassing of 3,000,000 
soldiers, 3,000 tanks, 2,000 airplanes, and 450,000 horses.335  On the Eastern Front, the 
Germans were not able to use the railways, because it took months to convert the Russian 
wide-gauge track to European gauge, and the Soviets evacuated or destroyed most of 
their rolling stock.336  The German automobile industry was one reason behind the failure 
of the Nazi regime to create a modern, motorized German Army.  Germany's automobile 
industry was not up to the task of producing the requisite number of vehicles needed to 
give Germany a completely motorized army.  As late as 1944, the army was still using 
requisitioned civilian vehicles, most of which were unsuitable for military use.  Germany 
repeatedly resorted to using captured equipment.  Also, the German military refused to 
order large numbers of motor vehicles because they believed that the technology was 
developing too fast and the purchases would be a waste of precious resources within a 
few months.337  Another reason was the German population’s general lack of interest or 
funds (due to the Versailles Treaty) in automobiles before the war.  In 1933, it was 
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estimated that there was one car for every eighty-nine citizens, compared to the one to 
five in the United States.  By 1937, Germany had closed the gap to one per every forty-
seven people.338   
Because Germany was a land of limited resources, including fuel and building 
supplies, the German military was not completely mechanized by the start of the war.  
Iron and steel were in short supplies and the three branches of the German military as 
well as the industry sector fought over the available supplies.  The government was 
forced to divide the limited iron and steel resources among the four, creating a power 
struggle.339  The Army was forced to use most of its allotment to build barracks, 
armaments, and fortifications; the rest were divided among weapons, ammunitions, 
equipment, and motor vehicles.340  Germany was dependent on foreign fuel, making 
complete mechanization implausible.341  Germany decided to depend on the horse once 
more because it was not dependent on oil or fuel.342  By the end of 1941, only 75,000 of 
the original 500,000 motor vehicles were still in working condition for the German Army 
on the Eastern Front and although the Germans did capture some 80,000 Soviet vehicles, 
only forty percent of these were in good condition.343  In 1943-1944, the United States 
produced 47,000 tanks while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns. Britain, 
in 1944, produced only 5000 tanks.  In 1944, Soviet tank production totaled 29,000.344  
The Red Army transferred its tanks to both the cavalry and the infantry before 1941.  The 
average Cavalry Corps possessed 16,000 horses, 128 light tanks, 1,300 vehicles, and 
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19,500 personnel.345  The Red Army’s Cavalry Corps steadily increased its number of 
horses from 16,000 in1941 to 18,000 in 1943.346  Soviet tank production was so high 
because of its massive losses against the Germans.  In 1941, the USSR lost 22,600 tanks; 
in 1943, it lost 22,400; and in 1944, it lost 16,900.  Of these, about 66 percent were 
destroyed in action while the rest were lost to mechanical breakdown.347  German 
armored fighting vehicles, constructed for the terrain conditions met with in Western 
Europe and therefore less sturdily built and broke down more frequently than the less 
sophisticated but more robust Russian machines.348   
During the Polish campaign alone Germany lost some 5,000  automobiles and 300 
tanks.  The German automobile industry had trouble building replacements; thus, General 
Franz Halder decided to begin filling the gaps with horses.  However, he knew that this 
plan had its limits.  He observed that each infantry division needed 4,500 horses and 
some 2,000 horse-drawn vehicles, leaving the army short by 1941.349  The use of horses 
increased in direct proportion to the losses of motor transport, draft horses were 
particularly high in demand for moving artillery and heavy supplies.350  Horses provided 
between seventy and eighty percent of the heavy lifting and transport capacity and 
remained essentially for infantry divisions due to their need for mounted reconnaissance 
units.351  In Figure 12 horses are shown pulling vehicles out of the deep mud on the 
Eastern Front; this is just one of the many use of horses by the German Army.352 
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Figure 11 
When their own horses began to fail due to conditions on the Eastern Front, the 
German Army impressed Polish-Russian farm animals known as panje.  These horses 
were small but hardy.  They needed little care and were insensitive to changes in 
temperature.353  While panje horses were used in transportation, they were unsuitable for 
heavy lifting and could not even pull the standard German Army horse-drawn vehicle 
because it was made of steel.  Troops had to use the Russian wagons and sleds the panje 
horses were accustomed to.354  In Figure 13 German soldiers pose with two panje horses 
and their wagon.355  
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Figure 12 
Reconnaissance units consisted also of armored cars, motorcycles, and bicyclists.  
Horses and bicycles were preferred because they did not create dust clouds that signals 
troop location.356  The German Army divided horses into two basic categories: mounts 
and draft horses. Mounts consisted of mounts for officers, cavalry-mounted vehicles and 
infantry-mounted vehicles, and mounts for miscellaneous uses.  Draft horses were 
divided into light, middle/leading horses, and machine gun horses.  Heavy and extra 
heavy draft horses pulled artillery and other extremely heavy supplies.357  Every horse 
purchased or requisitioned by the German Army was registered and given an 
identification number and detailed records were kept on an index card stating the horse’s 
name, age, description, and important medical information.358  The Red Army relied 
heavily on its horse cavalry during the opening days of the war because of its tank 
situation being in complete disarray.  Horse cavalry forces contributed significantly in the 
victories at Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, at Stalingrad in November and December 
1942, in the Ukraine during the winter of 1943-44, in Belorussia during the summer of 
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1944, and in Manchuria during August 1945.359  German horse battle casualties 
accounted for approximately seventy-five percent of the total losses.  Breed and color 
determined a horse’s survival rate on the Eastern Front.  Brown horses had the highest 
casualty rate as well as Thoroughbreds and German cold bloods (draft).  Mixed breeds 
and the French cold bloods had the best survival on the Eastern Front with a loss rate of 
about thirty percent compared to the more than fifty percent loss rate experienced by 
other breeds.360  The German Army went to great lengths to keep horses from falling into 
Soviet hands during the retreat back to Germany.  The most interesting example 
happened in 1944 when the 17th Army systematically shot and hurled 30,000 animals into 
the Bay of Severnaya after receiving the order to evacuate the Crimean peninsula.  The 
German Army was unable to transport the animals on their retreat and, thus, chose to 
liquidate its entire stock before leaving.361  
The invasion of the West gave Germany access to breeding regions in the Low 
Countries and France as well as the French Army’s entire stock of horses.362  By 1 
August 1940, some 34,000 horses had been sent back to Germany from the West.363  
France was the most valuable region in terms of horseflesh for the German Army.  By 
early 1942, occupied France had sent 153,000 horses to the German war effort.364  The 
horse situation was much worse in the Soviet Union because of forced collectivization 
and terror-famines during the Interwar period.  From 1928 to 1933, the Soviet Union's 
horse population declined from 32 million to 17 million.  There were three ways that the 
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German Army supplied replacements on the Eastern Front:  requisitioning from occupied 
territory either by confiscating or purchasing, employing captured animals, and shipping 
in replacements from the fatherland.365  All captured Soviet Army horses were to be sent 
to German Army veterinary services for examination and captured Soviet Army 
veterinary officers and blacksmiths were employed as well.366  Usually, horses were 
requisitioned by the German Army with any consideration for the Russian peasant’s 
plight.  However, some units found the policy of hiring farmers to be more effective 
against partisan groups.  Farmers were hired along with their wagon and horse.  They 
were usually released during the planting and harvesting seasons to work their own land 
and in some cases German soldiers were assigned to help the farmers bring in their crops 
if fighting allowed.367 
Heavy and extra heavy draft horses suffered most from air strikes because they 
were in close proximity to artillery line, which are a major target for the enemy.  Heavy 
warm bloods and extra-heavy cold bloods are more susceptible to extremes of 
temperature and required more fodder and water, which added to their high casualty 
rate.368  The greatest number of horses were lost on the Eastern Front by shell-fire or by 
aerial machine-gunning, and only seventeen percent died of heart failure brought about 
by overexertion.  Disease and exposure killed the remaining eight percent.369  Fodder was 
also a difficult problem in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union provided little in the way 
of oats and fodder for the German Army.  Germany had to ship its own fodder by rail, 
which placed more burdens on the already strained railway system.  Space was the 
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biggest issue because a ton of gasoline takes up only five cubic feet of space while a ton 
of fodder occupies five hundred cubic feet.370  Horses were housed in any available 
stables, barns and sheds; and even underground stable facilities like foxholes.371  The 
foxholes had to be large enough to house either two or three animals at a time.  Each 
foxhole measured approximately “3.25 meters long, from 3.5 to 4.5 meters wide, and 4.5 
meters deep” and included an incline from the animals to enter and exit quickly.  Soldiers 
observed that “horses soon learned to enter the holes themselves whenever they heard 
artillery fire.”372  In Figure 14 two horses take shelter in one of the many German 
foxholes on the Eastern Front.373  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 
Horses had a similar medical system like that of the German soldiers.  Mobile 
hospitals near the front performed triage and horses recovered in larger facilities to the 
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rear.374  Military horses required an extensive system of maintenance including farriers, 
veterinarians, training bases for new troopers, and an extensive procurement and remount 
system. Approximately 13,000 men served in the cavalry support services, including 
5,650 veterinarians; 8,100 NCOs and enlisted personnel; and 3,700 farriers. Each doctor 
was responsible for between 300 and 400 horses and mules.”375  Another invaluable 
section of the Germany Army was remount training.  Remount training was mainly 
conducted by women in riding clubs and in army riding schools.376 
During the first year of the war on the Eastern Front, the German Army lost some 
264,954 horses that were either killed, sick, or otherwise unfit for service.377  It has been 
estimated that an average of about 700 horses were lost each day during the four-year 
Russian campaign.378  During World War II, the German military used 2.75 million 
horses.379  The Germany Army used approximately 3 million horses and mules during the 
Second World War with more than 1.7 million dying during the course of the war.  Many 
of the survivors were confiscated by the victors, never to return to their homeland.380  The 
Soviet forces used a total of 3.5 million animals during World War II.381  Regions other 
than Germany and the Soviet Union experienced major losses in their horse population.  
During the war, Poland lost thirty-six percent of its total horse population.382 
 Despite the mechanization on the Eastern Front, the horse closed the war once 
again in a front and center position in the Soviet Union.  Before the Soviet Victory 
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Parade in Moscow, Joseph Stalin asked to see one of his most prominent generals, 
Marshal Georgii Zhukov.  According to Zhukov, Stalin asked him if he had forgotten 
how to ride since it had been many years since his cavalry days.  Zhukov replied that he 
still remembered and continued to do so.  Stalin’s next request shocked the general.  
Stalin asked Zhukov to open the ceremonies by riding a horse into Red Square.  To this, 
Zhukov replied, “Thank you for the honour , but wouldn’t it be better for you to take the 
salute?  You are Supreme Commander-in-Chief and by right you should take the salute.”  
Stalin ended to the conversation by simply saying, “I am too old to review parades.  You 
do it, you are younger.”  And with that, Marshal Zhukov entered Red Square riding a 
white, Akhal-Teke horse (an Arabian mix) on 24 June 1945 to celebrate the Soviet 
Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany.383  After the show of might by the Soviet Union, the 
horse now has been relegated to dressage spectacles, parades, and the memories of noble 
knights, wild cowboys, and gallant cavalries. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
 The decline of the horse in European and American warfare was not a single line 
of obsolescence, but one of many avenues, led by the development of numerous 
innovations in warfare.  During the Crimean War, horses were the most important war 
machine; however, by the First World War motorized vehicles like the automobile, the 
tank, and the airplane had begun to supplant the horse on the battlefield.  By the end of 
the Second World War, the horse had been completely removed from the art of war.  The 
rapid progression of technology from the Crimean War to the Second World War ended 
the horse’s effectiveness in the military, especially with the invention of the railroad, the 
car, the tank, the machine gun, and the airplane.  Each invention played a major role in 
ousting the horse from the military.  With each successive war between 1850 and 1950, 
armies added new and novel technologies to their arsenal, leaving the horse no place to 
go but back to the home front.  These inventions first removed the mounted cavalry, then 
the horse-drawn artillery before finally forcing the horse off the battlefield altogether.  
After the Second World War the war horse became completely obsolete to the art of war, 
formally demoted to a mere symbol of prestige, gallantry, status, and bygone days.  The 
war completely mechanized the military, roads, and farms.  The Crimean War began the  
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war horse’s rapid descent into obscurity.  Over the next 100 years the war horse 
experienced a form of obsolescence, delayed by the traditional mentality that horses are a 
necessity and by new technology that took many decades to root in society due to man’s 
straggle-hold on that traditional mindset.  Thus, because of man’s tendency to shy away 
from change, the war horse experienced delayed obsolescence, remaining an integral part 
of society until after the Second World War.   
After the Second World War, society changed its view of the horse from an 
animal of labor to a pet.  The 1950s saw a massive shift in horse numbers from farm  
animals to family pets due to the changing perception and accessibility of automobiles 
and tractors.  Communities experienced the economic boom of the decade, allowing 
farmers to replace their horses more readily with machines.  In Britain, automobiles and 
agricultural machines surpassed the number of horses remaining in the countryside.  By 
1950, only 494,000 horses remained in the British Isles and only seventy percent of those 
remaining were still used in agriculture.  By 1965, only 21,000 horses were still 
employed in the British agricultural sector.384  After the war, Britain possessed 4,409,000 
motorized vehicles and 387,000 tractors.385   
The horse became obsolete in terms of public transportation, farming, and 
warfare.  Some communities did retain their horses for traditional reasons such as the 
Amish and the Mennonite communities, who shun modern technologies.  Nostalgia is the 
main reason why horses remain a major part of man’s society and conscience.  This 
nostalgia manifests itself in multiple ways including ranches, rodeos, horse-drawn 
carriages, and parades.  There still exists a need for working horses, mainly as mounted 
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police in large cities such as New York and New Orleans and on working ranches.  The 
mounted police remain a valuable asset to the force because of their ability to tower over 
mobs, intimidating them into submission as well as having a better view of the situation.  
Draft horses are now mainly reserved for horse shows, parades, and heavy horse 
competitions.  Hot bloods and warm bloods are now mainly pleasure horses either pets or 
competitions and races.  The warm bloods have seen the biggest increase in horse-owning 
society because of their versatility and amiable disposition.  They have found a place 
among humans before as a pleasure horse and as a working horse. 
The horse was relegated to recreational roles as well as parade spectacles.  The 
horse became a pleasure animal used only for the occasional riding and yet still 
commanded attention during parades, while still retaining its symbolism and status in 
society’s eyes.  The end of the war brought about a change in the symbology of the horse 
from one of gallantry to an object of mockery; however, the horse still remains in the 
hearts and minds of all humans.  For most, it conjures up images of dueling knights and 
proud cowboys rather than the beast of burden that is was for thousands of years.  The 
war horse did not quietly slink quietly into oblivion; however, the Second World War 
sealed its fate:  for whom the bells toll… they toll for thee, old pal. 
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Franco-Prussian War and the Anglo-Boer War.  Technology began its takeover of 
transportation and shock tactics during the First World War with the employment 
of the airplane, the tank, and the automobile on the massive scale.  Despite this 
massive employment of recent mechanized technology, the war horse remained 
pertinent to European warfare due to the relative novelty of these innovations.  
The European war horse fought its last war in 1939.  The horse was used very 
little on the Western Front while the Germans and the Soviets were forced to de-
modernize their armies by reintroducing the war horse to the battle field.  
Technology completely replaced the war horse by the end of the Second World 
War with its widespread accessibility, quick production turnover, and cheaper 
maintenance costs. 
 
 
 
 
